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DOES AN ECONOMIC CRISIS MERIT A
PRIMA FACIE FINDING OF "EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCES" OR OTHER
EMERGENCY RELIEF? THE IMPACT OF
THE CREDIT COUNSELING PROVISION OF
BAPCPA UPON DISTRESSED
HOMEOWNERS IN A SEVERE NATIONAL
ECONOMIC DOWNTURN
GLORIA J. LIDDELL, PEARSON LIDDELL, JR. &
MICHAEL J. HIGHFIELD*

I.

THE HISTORY OF BAPCPA AND THE CREDIT
COUNSELING PROVISION

A. A Brief History of the Origin of BAPCPA
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act (BAPCPA) was signed into law on October 17, 2005.1 Since the
passage of the first "permanent" U.S. laW2 to recognize the need to
provide relief to distressed debtors in 1898,3 bankruptcy law has
experienced change-some momentous, some with less weighty

* Gloria J. Liddell is an Assistant Professor of Business Law at Mississippi
State University. Person Liddell, Jr., is a Professor of Business Law at
Mississippi State University. Michael J. Highfield is an Associate Professor of
Finance at Mississippi State University. Authors Pearson and Gloria Liddell
acknowledge the grammatical editorial contributions to this paper by their
son, Joshua Nelson Liddell. We have no doubt he thoroughly enjoyed having
the opportunity to "do unto others as they did unto him."
1. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11
U.S.C.).
2. The first U.S. Bankruptcy law was the Bankruptcy Act of 1800, Ch. 19,
2 Stat. 19. It, along with its successors that preceded the Bankruptcy Act of
1898, was of very short duration and limited in applicability. Charles Jordan
Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 5, 14-23 (1995).
3. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed 1979). See Tabb,
supra note 2, at 24 (explaining that the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 signaled the
beginning of the modern era of liberal debtor relief in U.S. bankruptcy laws).
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consequence overall. 4 The most pertinent change relevant to this
discussion is The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19945 (the "1994
Amendments"). Among the accomplishments of the 1994
Amendments 6 was the establishment of the National Bankruptcy
Review Commission7 (the "Commission"). The charge of this body
was, among other things, "to investigate and study issues and
problems relating to [the Bankruptcy Code]."8 Although many of

4. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was succeeded in historical significance by
the Chandler Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 883 (1938) (repealed 1978). The next major
reform of the bankruptcy laws came decades later with the passage of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (commonly referred to as the Code), Pub.L.
No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978), a major milestone in substance and direction
for bankruptcy law in this country. See generally Clive W. Bare, The
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 47 TENN. L. REV. 501 (1980) (describing the
legislative history of the Act); Sean C. Currie, The Multiple Purposes of
Bankruptcy: Restoring Bankruptcy's Social InsuranceFunction After BAPCPA,
7 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 241 (2009) (discussing the original purpose of the
2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code); Jeffrey D. Eaton, Note, Locked
Out: The Unwary Debtor and BAPCPA's Pre-File Credit Counseling
Requirement, 32 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 261 (2010) (arguing the ineffectiveness
of the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code). Then, in 1984 President
Reagan signed into law the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984) (the "1984 Amendments"),
which contained several revisions to the Code. The driving impetus behind the
passage of the 1984 Amendments was the necessity to tackle the quandary
provoked by the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Northern
Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982),
regarding the unconstitutional grant of jurisdiction to U.S. bankruptcy judges
as non-Article III judges. The next significant amendment to the bankruptcy
laws occurred a decade later in 1994 with the passage of The Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994). This law
"constitutes the most comprehensive revision of the United States Bankruptcy
Code and the related jurisdictional provisions since the Code's inception in
1979." Ned W. Waxman, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, 11 BANK. DEV. J.
311, 311 (1994/1995).
5. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106
(1994).
6. The Act affects the following aspects of bankruptcy law: jurisdiction,
procedure, and eligibility; case administration; professional fees;
property of the estate and the trustee's avoiding powers; claims;
exemptions and lien avoidance; discharge; the automatic stay; unexpired
leases; bankruptcy relief under chapters 7, 11, 12, and 13; sovereign
immunity; and other miscellaneous issues. It also establishes the
National Bankruptcy Review Commission to investigate and evaluate
the need for future changes to the Bankruptcy Code.
Waxman, supra note 4, at 312.
7. Id.
8. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 603, 108
Stat. 4106, 4147 (1994). In offering the proposal to establish the review
commission, Senator Grassley expressed that the purpose of the Commission
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the recommendations of the Commission were not ultimately
adopted by BAPCPA,9 it may fairly be said that the Commission
Report served as a progenitor of BAPCPA-or at least sowed the
seeds for its eventual passage.' 0 Yet the path from the its frail

was in "fine tuning" the bankruptcy laws rather than overhauling them. 140
CONG. REC. S4508 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
9. The following illustrates the point:
The 1028-page report, accompanied by 272 pages of additional and
dissenting views, contained 172 recommendations. The conceptual
framework of some of these recommendations was ultimately reflected
in BAPCPA..

.

. Other proposals were ignored ....

The thirty-four recommendations concerning consumer bankruptcy were
among the most divisive considered by the Commissioners, four of whom
prepared a lengthy dissent with respect to many of these
recommendations. While they generally supported certain consumer
bankruptcy recommendations (some of which were included in
BAPCPA), the four dissenting Commissioners most strongly opposed
[certain] recommendations....
The dissenting Commissioners argued for a package of reforms that was
very different from the majority's recommendations....
Over the next eight years, the dissent's arguments would become the
same arguments for many of the consumer bankruptcy reforms reflected
in BAPCPA.
One month before the Commission filed its final report on October 20,
1997, legislation was introduced that would largely reflect the views of
the dissenting Commissioners with respect to the direction of consumer
bankruptcy reforms. On September 18, 1997, Representative Bill
McCollum (R-FL), with Representative Rick Boucher (D-VA) as an
original cosponsor, introduced H.R. 2500, the "Responsible Borrower
Protection Bankruptcy Act," which set out the rudimentary elements of
means testing for consumer debtors as well as other provisions
protective of consumer creditor interests. . . . H.R. 2500 ultimately

garnered the support of 185 bipartisan co-sponsors, but it was not
formally considered by the Congress as it was subsumed by
subsequently introduced legislation.
The day after the Commission filed its report, Senators Charles
Grassley (R-IA) and Richard Durbin (D-IL) introduced S. 1301, the
Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1997,

. .

. on October 21, 1997.

Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485, 487-88, 493-94
(2005).
10. "The establishment of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission in
1994 either intentionally or unintentionally galvanized the consumer creditor
community and ultimately became the impetus for BAPCPA." Id. at 486; See
also Barry Rehfeld, Top Creditor Lobbyist Tassey Goes For Broke, AM.
BANKER, May 17, 2001, at 1 (noting that the Commission's hearings "became
the starting point in rounding up support for the meaningful change that
creditors wanted"). Jensen, supra note 9, at 486 n.4 (quoting a statement from
Rep. John Conyers, ranking member of the House Judiciary Committee,
observing that he had "never seen this much excitement around a subject
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origins to passage was tortuous and fraught with legislative
maneuvering, political theater," intensive special interest
lobbying efforts,12 and even direct intervention by then First Lady
Hillary Rodham Clinton.13 Legislative efforts to reform the
bankruptcy laws coursed through the 105th to the 109th
Congresses with control of the Congress and the White House
shifting from one political party to another.14 Creditor and banking
groups sought to encourage a congressional revamping of the
federal bankruptcy laws through their intensive lobbying efforts.' 5
These financial institutions were concerned about what they
considered the "consumer friendly" nature of the bankruptcy laws
and the acceleration in filings that had been occurring since the

that's usually considered so arcane" and that the Commission "has somehow
stirred the passions of everybody on the spectrum").
11. Id. at 519-20. "The 106th Congress began with the Senate's conduct of
the President's impeachment trial in January 1999" over which House
Judiciary Committee Chairman Hyde was appointed to serve as trial manager
along with twelve other Republican members of the committee. Id. at 519.
Shortly thereafter, bankruptcy legislation was introduced which essentially
consisted of the legislation that had been considered by the prior Congress. Id.
at 520. In making concluding remarks about an amendment Chairman Hyde
was proposing to the bankruptcy legislation, Chairman Hyde paid homage to
the creditor lobby stating, "[tihey are awesome." Id. at 528. His proposed
amendment was defeated. Id. at 528 (citing 145 CONG. REc. H2723 (daily ed.
May 5, 1999)).
12. See generally Jensen, supra note 9 (discussing the legislative history of
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005).
13. Id. at 508 (stating that "First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, in her
May 6, 1998 syndicated column, also expressed concern that the legislation
'could undermine the ability of some parents to collect child support."') First
Lady Clinton's concerns were later essentially echoed by her husband,
President Clinton, in his weekly radio address. Id. at 508 n.116. She would
weigh in again as Senator Hillary Clinton on a similar issue regarding child
support, and expressing support for final passage of the bill then pending. Id.
at 544-45.
14. Jensen, supra note 9.
15. Id. at 493, 494; See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. H9146 (1998) (statement of
Sen. Kennedy) (stating, "[a]ll year long Congress has been teaming [sic] with
credit card lobbyists pushing for legislation making it harder for consumers,
for working Americans, to get relief from crushing debt woes."); Ronald J.
Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the "Sweat Box" of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U.
ILL. L. REV. 375, 376 n.1 (citing 144 CONG. REc. H10225 (1998) (statement of
Rep. Nadler)) (arguing that the bill was written "by and for" credit card
companies); Gloria J. Liddell & Pearson Liddell, Jr., So He Huffed and He
Puffed ... But will the Home(stead) Fall Down?: The Applicability of Section
522(p)(1) of the United States Bankruptcy Code to Varying Interest
Accumulations of the Debtor in Homestead Property, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 729,
732, 733 (2009) (discussing lobbying efforts in relation to the homestead
exemption).
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last major overhaul of the bankruptcy laws with the passage of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act in 1979 and its subsequent amendments.16
What largely resulted with the passage of BAPCPA were revisions
that created a bankruptcy climate distinctly less sympathetic to
the consumer debtor.' 7 Since its passage, courts, scholars, and
commentators have noted that the poor craftsmanship of BAPCPA
has left many of its provisions subject to varying interpretations
by the courts.' 8

16. See Thomas Bak, John Gomant & James A. Woods, A Comparison of
the Effects of the 1978 and 2005 Bankruptcy Reform Legislationon Bankruptcy
FilingRates, 25 EMORY BANKR. DEv. J. 11 (2008) (describing the ramifications
for filing rates in the aftermath of the 1978 and 2005 legislations); Tabb, supra
note 2, at 37 (stating "the credit industry, unhappy with increased bankruptcy
filings and mounting bad debt losses, has steadily lobbied for amendments
providing for harsher treatment of debtors").
17. In re Sosa, 336 B.R. 113,114 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005).
The Congress of the United States of America passed and the President
of the United States of America signed into law the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (the "Act"). It became
fully effective on October 17, 2005. Those responsible for the passing of
the Act did all in their power to avoid the proffered input from sitting
United States Bankruptcy Judges, various professors of bankruptcy law
at distinguished universities, and many professional associations filled
with the best of the bankruptcy lawyers in the country as to the
perceived flaws in the Act. This is because the parties pushing the
passage of the Act had their own agenda. It was apparently an agenda
to make more money off the backs of the consumers in this country. It is
not surprising, therefore, that the Act has been highly criticized across
the country. In this writer's opinion, to call the Act a "consumer
protection" Act is the grossest of misnomers.
Id.
From its Orwellian title, an example of deceptive advertising if ever
there was one, to the last of its 512 pages, the bankruptcy bill recently
passed by Congress presents numerous challenges to attorneys who
represent consumer debtors. . . . There is no doubt that bankruptcy
relief will be more expensive for almost all debtors, less effective for
many debtors, and totally inaccessible for some debtors as a result of the
new law.
Henry J. Sommer, Trying to Make Sense Out of Nonsense: Representing
Consumers Under the 'Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005", 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191, 191 (2005). See also Michael Simkovic,
The Effect of BAPCPA on Credit Card Industry Profits and Prices, 83 AM.
BANKR. L. J. 1, 1 (2009) (stating "[BAPCPA] increased the costs and decreased
the benefits of bankruptcy to consumers").
18. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, The Challenge to the Bench and Bar Presented
by the 2005 Bankruptcy Act: Resistance Need Not Be Futile, 2007 U. ILL. L.
REV. 93, 97 (2007) (declaring that "[t]he problems with the 2005 Act are
breathtaking. There are typos, sloppy choices of words, hanging paragraphs,
and inconsistencies. Worse, there are largely pointless but burdensome new
requirements, overlapping layers of screening, mounds of new paperwork, and
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B. Impact of the Credit Counseling Provision
In its 1997 report to Congress, 19 the Commission made
several recommendations with respect to the issue of credit
counseling. The Commission recommended that "all debtors in
both Chapter 7 and in Chapter 13 should have the opportunity to
participate in a financial education program."2 0 However, the

structural incoherence."). Braucher goes on to reference a case, In re Sosa, 336
B.R. at 116, wherein she characterizes the court as "venting" sarcastically over
its frustrations with BAPCPA with respect to the very provision that is the
subject of this paper. Id. at 102. Braucher notes, "[s]ection 109(h) could be read
as creating a trap for debtors who are desperate, uninformed, or both. In re
Sosa is a case in which this trap played out; on the eve of foreclosure, the
debtors filed pro se without first requesting credit counseling services." Id.
One bankruptcy judge's exasperated response to the inequities of Section
109(h) was as follows:
Simply stated, if a debtor does not request the required credit
counseling services from an approved nonprofit budget and credit
counseling service before the petition is filed, that person is ineligible to
be a debtor no matter how dire the circumstances the person finds
themselves in at that moment.
This Court views this requirement as inane. However, it is a clear and
unambiguous provision obviously designed by Congress to protect
consumers....
Because the Debtors did not request such counseling before they filed
their case, Congress says they are ineligible for relief under the Act. Can
any rational human being make a cogent argument that this makes any
sense at all?
But let's not stop there. If the Debtors' case is dismissed and they re-file
a new case within the next year, it may be that some creditor will take
the position that the new case should be presumed to be filed not in good
faith. See 11 U.S.C. §362 (c)(3)(C). Section 362 further states that if
subsection (c)(3)(C) applies, then the stay in that second case will only
be good for thirty days unless the debtor (i) files a motion, (ii) obtains a
hearing and ruling by the Court within such thirty-day period and (iii)
proves by clear and convincing evidence that the second case was filed in
good faith. It should be obvious to the reader at this point how truly
concerned Congress is for the individual consumers of this country.
Apparently, it is not the individual consumers of this country that make
the donations to the members of Congress that allow them to be elected
and re-elected and re-elected and re-elected.
Id. at 103 (quoting In re Sosa, 336 B.R. at 115); See also Sommer, supra note
17, at 191 (asserting that "[o]ne of the chief problems that will be confronted is
atrocious drafting, especially in many of the consumer provisions of the bill.").
19. Elizabeth Warren et al., 1.1.5 FinancialEducation, NAT'L BANKR. REV.
COMM'N FINAL REPORT, Oct. 20, 1997, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/repo
rt/05bcons.html.
20. 1.1.5 Financial Education
All debtors in both Chapter 7 and in Chapter 13 should have the
opportunity to participate in a financial education program.
When consumer debtors emerge from bankruptcy, whether Chapter 7 or
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13, they inevitably continue to participate in consumer credit
transactions. A legal fresh start may not prevent repeated financial
failure if debtors do not have the skills to manage the credit
marketplace. Repeated financial failure does not benefit debtors,
creditors or the public interest.
There is an emerging consensus for the need for pre- and
postbankruptcy financial education for all families. New financial
devices join the consumer lending market each year. In addition to home
mortgages, credit cards, finance company loans, car loans, and retail
installment credit, consumers now may be offered financial devices that
did not exist just a few years ago, such as preapproved home equity lines
of credit, live checks, and overdraft accounts. Managing the family
budget is a greater challenge than ever before in a world of compound
interest, rent-to-own contracts, FIFO accounting on repayment of
secured consumer loans, teaser rates, grace periods, minimum payments
based on unknown amortization schedules, declining balances, and
other financial terms imbedded in consumer loan contracts. Even for
consumers not beset by job losses or unexpected medical emergencies,
household budgeting is not an easy task. The people who file for
bankruptcy often have demonstrated the pressing need for heightened
understanding of family finances.
Representatives from every part of the consumer bankruptcy systemcreditors, debtors, trustees, judges, and academics-have spoken to the
Commission about the unique opportunity for education that is
presented when debtors go through the bankruptcy system. They note
that a financial catastrophe is an appropriate time to reestablish their
economic equilibrium and learn important lessons on financial
management.
Financial counseling of debtors in bankruptcy is hardly a new notion.
While the subject has been discussed for decades, however, the current
system still does not meet the need for debtor financial education in a
systematic way. The Chapter 13 trustees in several judicial districts
have established programs that have been the subjects of praise. Far
more districts have no analogous programs in either Chapter 13 or
Chapter 7. One roadblock to development has been lack of specific
authorization to expend funds to initiate and run such programs;
apparently, the authority of Chapter 13 trustees to use funds for
education programs has been challenged, as has the amount of funds
that can be used. In the meantime, some debtors' attorneys assume the
roles of financial counselors, but many do not. This type of
individualized counseling may not be available to debtors with the
greatest need.
The Commission will not attempt to spell out the details of a bankruptcy
education program. Better suited parties already are developing more
specific details about the kinds of programs to be offered, how they
might be evaluated, who should administer them, how content should be
determined and how they could be funded. To enhance these efforts, the
Commission endorses the exploration of various alternatives, potentially
through the development of pilot programs. However, education should
be initiated at every level, and need not wait for any specific program.
The Commission's Recommendation focuses on authorizing and
increasing the availability of voluntary education programs. It
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report made it clear that "voluntary programs are the preferable
course of action."21 BAPCPA makes credit counseling mandatory. 22
Section 109 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the "Code") is
statutorily entitled "Who may be a Debtor" and proceeds to define
the individual who may be a debtor within the meaning of this
statute. Subsection (h) states, in pertinent part, as follows:
(h) (1) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), and notwithstanding any
other provision of this section, an individual may not be a debtor
under this title unless such individual has, during the 180-day
period preceding the date of filing of the petition by such individual,
received from an approved nonprofit budget and credit counseling
agency described in section 111(a) [11 USC § 111(a)] an individual
or group briefing (including a briefing conducted by telephone or on
the Internet) that outlined the opportunities for available credit
counseling and assisted such individual in performing a related
budget analysis.
(3) (A) Subject to subparagraph (B), the requirements of paragraph
(1) shall not apply with respect to a debtor who submits to the court
a certification that(i) describes exigent circumstances that merit a waiver of the
requirements of paragraph (1);
(ii) states that the debtor requested credit counseling services from
an approved nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency, but was
unable to obtain the services referred to in paragraph (1) during the
5-day period beginning on the date on which the debtor made that
request; and

contemplates that bankruptcy judges could, in their discretion, require
debtors to participate in education programs in appropriate
circumstances. Some parties strongly advocate mandatory programs in
all cases. Mandatory programs may be unduly coercive and difficult to
administer. Mandatory education might also impose a hardship on a
debtor whose job interferes with the class schedule, or who lives in a
rural area. Voluntary programs are the preferable course of action until
various types of postbankruptcy educational programs can be evaluated.
A Recommendation for postbankruptcy consumer financial education
should not diminish support for other financial education programs that
might avert financial crises in the first place. Creditor associations and
individual banks and credit unions provide some financial education
resources and budget counselors to help their present and future
borrowers avoid bankruptcy. Improving individuals' knowledge of
financial matters and money management can and should be
encouraged on several fronts.
Warren et al., supra note 19.
21.

Id.

22.

11 U.S.C. § 109 (2006).
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(iii) is satisfactory to the court.
(B) With respect to a debtor, an exemption under subparagraph (A)
shall cease to apply to that debtor on the date on which the debtor
meets the requirements of paragraph (1), but in no case may the
exemption apply to that debtor after the date that is 30 days after
the debtor files a petition, except that the court, for cause, may
order an additional 15 days.
(4) The requirements of paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect
to a debtor whom the court determines, after notice and hearing is
unable to complete those requirements because of incapacity,
disability, or active military duty in a military combat zone. For the
purposes of this paragraph, incapacity means that the debtor is
impaired by reason of mental illness or mental deficiency so that he
is incapable of realizing and making rational decisions with respect
to his financial responsibilities; and 'disability' means that the
debtor is so physically impaired as to be unable, after reasonable
effort, to participate in an in person, telephone, or Internet briefing
required under paragraph (1).23
Thus, the effect of subsection (h)(1) is to disqualify persons
from "be[ing) a debtor" 24 and hence, gain the protections of the
bankruptcy laws when that person has not participated in a credit
counseling session under the terms set forth therein.2 5 Statutory
exceptions to the applicability of this provision include residing in
a district where such counseling services have been determined
not to be reasonably available, 26 the inability to obtain such
counseling due to active military service, and certain physically
and mentally disabling conditions. 27 In addition, if the debtor can
certify "exigent circumstances" that merit a waiver of the
requirements of Section 109(h)(1) to the satisfaction of the court,
the debtor may be temporarily exempt from the credit counseling
requirement. 28 However, even with the waiver, the debtor must
certify that approval for credit counseling services was requested
by the debtor and that the debtor was unable to obtain these
services within five days of making the request.29 The "exigent
circumstances" exception is the focus of this Article.

23. Id. § 109(h) (emphasis added).
24.

Id.

25. In re Wallert, 332 B.R. 884, 891 (Bankr. D. Minn 2005) (stating that a
petitioner expressly cannot qualify as a debtor unless the petitioner meets the

credit counseling requirements of § 109(h)).
26. 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(2).
27. Id. § 109(h)(4).
28. Id. § 109(h)(3).
29.

Id. § 109(h)(3)(A)(ii).
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C. Scope of This Topic
When BAPCPA was enacted in 2005, few foresaw the
unprecedented financial meltdown of 2007-2009. Former Federal
Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan termed it a "once-in-acentury credit tsunami."3 0 Former Secretary of the Treasury,
Henry M. Paulson, Jr., said that such a convergence of negative
financial conditions should happen only once or twice in a
century.3 1 This level of financial turmoil has not been seen since
the end of the Great Depression over sixty years ago. 32 In April
2009, one in every 374 housing units received a foreclosure
notice-the highest monthly rate since a California based
foreclosure listing firm began making such reports in 2005.33
Foreclosures in April 2009 were thirty-two percent higher than in
April 2008.34 According to a recent study, about twenty percent of
homeowners in the U.S. owe more on their homes than their
homes are worth as a result of the economic downturn.3 5 The April
2009 national unemployment rate, 8.9 %,36 is the highest in
twenty-five years.37 Major financial institutions have failed or are
under government supervision. 38 Chrysler filed for bankruptcy
30. Alan Greenspan, Testimony before the Comm. of Gov't Oversight and
Reform (Oct. 23, 2008), http://clipsandcomment.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/
10/greenspan-testimony-20081023.pdf.
31. Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Sec'y, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, Remarks at
the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Nov. 20, 2008, available at
http://www.millennium-traders.comlnews/marketcommentarynovember2008.a
spx.
32. John M. Bonora, Fresh-start Reporting: An Opportunity for Debtor
Companies Emerging from Bankruptcy, 28-6 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 48, 48 (2009)
(stating "we are in the midst of the worst economic crisis since the Great
Depression.").
33. David Leibowitz, Foreclosures at Record Levels in April-Failure of
Bankruptcy Legislation to Blame, MORTGAGE LAW NETWORK, May 13, 2009,
availableat http://www.mortgagelawnetwork.com/foreclosures-at-record-levels
-in-april-failure-of-bankruptcy-legislation-to-blame/.
34. Robert Daniel, U.S. Foreclosures at Record Rate in April, WALL ST. J.,
May 13, 2009, available at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/us-foreclosuresreach-record-rate-in-april.
35. Ruth Simon & James R. Hagerty, House-Price Drops Leave More
Underwater, WALL ST. J., May 6, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/articl
e/SB124156804522089735.html.
36. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT SITUATION SUMMARY
(2009), http://link.gs/p6st.
37. April 2009 Unemployment Rate 8.9V/--Chart of the Day, THE SUN'S
FIN. DIARY, May 8, 2009, http://www.thesunsfinancialdiary.com/charts/april2009-unemployment-rate-89-chart-day/.
38. A. Mechele Dickerson, Over-indebtedness, the Subprime Mortgage
Crisis,and the Effect on U.S. Cities, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 395, 415 (2009).
[This financial crisis has had a catastrophic effect on the entire
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protection on April 30, 2009, and General Motors followed suit
approximately one month later, not long after the closing of more
than one-third of its dealerships. 39
In 2008, Wall Street suffered its worst year since 1931.40 This
financial crisis began with a market correction of inflated housing
prices that drained the illusory capital from of an unsuspecting
market. 41 When the depth of this economic upheaval is examined,
involving Bear Stearns, AIG, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, General
Motors, Chrysler, Wachovia, and many more, there is general
agreement that this monetary imbroglio is the worse convergence
of bad news since at least World War 11.42 While the plights of the
multinational conglomerates are grabbing the headlines, it must
be remembered that the crisis that began in the housing market
and spread to the financial markets is now in the supermarket. 43
Everyday people are being adversely affected. Jobs have been lost,
and families in good financial condition have seen their financial
condition deteriorate, seemingly almost overnight.44 Many, having
no choice, are seeking the protections of our bankruptcy laws.45

financial community-especially the financial industry and other
entities involved with mortgage securitization. Specifically, the liquidity
restriction that led to the collapse of Bear Stearns and Lehman
Brothers, two of the largest investment banks in the world, caused the
U.S. government to take over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and place
them in a conservatorship, to purchase an 80% interest in American
International Group (the country's largest insurance conglomerate) to
agree to insure the holdings of some money market mutual funds, to
spend hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars to purchase debt from
(and stocks of) U.S. banks, and has forced the liquidation of a number of
mortgage lenders and hedge funds that invested in those lenders.
Id.
39. Paul Ingrassia, How GM Lost Its Way, WALL ST. J., June 3, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124389995447074461.html.
40. Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understandingthe
FinancialCrisis, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 7 (2009).
41. Id. at 7-8.
42. Id. at 7-9.
43. See Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime
Mortgage Contracts,94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073, 1074 (2009) (asserting that the
subprime crisis has affected plethora parties, including the local
neighborhoods).
44. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking:
Financial Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis,41
CONN. L. REV. 963, 968 (2009) (stating that 4.4 million jobs were lost in the
United States January 2008 through February 2009).
45. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 3-5 (2008) (surmising that the easy credit, including subprime
mortgages, led consumer debtors to financial distress and social distress,
followed by bankruptcies and foreclosures).
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Even the former chairman of Merrill Lynch compared the
current crisis to the Great Depression, the gold standard for all
economic upheavals.46 The American economy has been in a period
of drastically slowed growth since December 2007, the longest
since the Great Depression. 47 In recent recessions the American
economy dug its way out by exporting goods and services, but
because this recession is worldwide, such prospects are dismal;48
again reminiscent of the Great Depression. Economists Vernon L.
Smith, Nobel Laureate, and Steven Gjerstad believe that the
economic occurrences of the past ten years bear striking
similarities to the Great Depression. 49 The most important
similarity, according to Smith and Gjerstad, is that both the Great
Depression and the current economic crisis had their genesis in
consumer debt concentrated on the lower end of the wealth scale,
which allows the effects of the crisis to be "transmitted quickly and
forcefully into the financial system."50 Such a hypothesis seems to
be supported by the accelerated rate of bankruptcy filings and
forebodes much trouble for the average consumer.51
In sum, these are unprecedented and stressful times. 52 At the

46. Greg Farrell, Merrill Chief Sees Severe Global Slowdown, FINANCIAL
TIMES, Nov. 11, 2008, http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?newsid=tfo11
120080957111501.
47. Moran, supra note 40, at 77.
48. See Fred Bergsten, Trade Has Saved America from Recession,
FINANCIAL TIMES, June 30, 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d87f2158-46a4-11
dd-876a-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_&nclick_check=1 (projecting that eighty
percent of U.S. economic growth in 2008-2009 will come from exports); David
J. Lynch, 'Green Shoots' Have a Long Way to Grow; Economic Outlook
Remains Bleak as World Leaders Meet, USA TODAY, Apr. 24, 2009, at lB
(explaining that global growth is set to increase four percent in 2008 and 2009
due to exports even though the U.S. has a sharp slowdown in its economy).
49. Steven Gjerstad & Vernon L. Smith, From Bubble to Depression?,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12389761280279128
1.html.
50. Id.
The causes of the Great Depression need more study, but the claims
that losses on stock-market speculation and a monetary contraction
caused the decline of the banking system both seem inadequate. It
appears that both the Great Depression and the current crisis had their
origins in excessive consumer debt-especially mortgage debt-that was
transmitted into the financial sector during a sharp downturn.
Id.
51. Mike Baker, Bankruptcies Soar Despite Legal Changes; 1.5 Million
FilingsPredicted This Year, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 14, 2009, at 6.
52. John M. Bonora, Fresh-start Reporting: An Opportunity for Debtor
Companies Emerging from Bankruptcy, 28-6 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 48, 48
(2009).
In 2008, there were 43,546 business bankruptcies-a 65 percent
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time of the passage of BAPCPA, it is unlikely that Congress could
have fathomed that our nation would have been facing an
economic crisis of this magnitude.53 It is doubtful that such a
remake of our bankruptcy system would have been structured in
this manner in today's climate. 54 Section 109(h) of the Code places
an additional burden upon individuals who are already operating
within a stressed economic structure. The state of the economy
when in severe decline should, by definition, be deemed an exigent
circumstance such that an individual would be able to waive (at
least temporarily) the pre-bankruptcy credit counseling
requirement set forth in the statute.55
In this Article, we discuss some of the legal issues
surrounding Section 109(h) and the failure to comply therewith.
The exigent circumstances exception is reviewed to ascertain what
types of circumstances courts deem eligible to fall within this "safe
harbor" provision. Further, to provide analogous logic for the
proposed thesis, we compare the proposed recommendation for
invoking the "exigent circumstances" provision of the Code in an
effort to invoke force majeure and other commercial
impracticability type provisions in contractual settings, both
arguments being based upon the severity of the nation's economy.
We also discuss the special provision adopted in response to
Hurricane Katrina regarding compliance with Section 109(h) to
accommodate that extraordinary circumstance. Finally, we
propose solutions to what we deem an unnecessarily burdensome
mechanism for carrying out what these authors assume to be the
intention of Congress in adopting this provision, and alternatively,
we propose recommendations for legislative modification.

increase over 2007, and more than double the 2006 figure of 19,965. A
total of 9,272 of those 2008 cases involved a chapter 11 filing-again, a
dramatic increase over the 2007 and 2006 totals (there were 5,736 in
2007 and 5,163 in 2006).
Id.
53. See generally, R. Travis Santos, Comment, The Legal Way to Defeat
Optimus Sub-prime, 25 BANK. DEV. J. 285 (2008) (discussing the various
changes Congress is contemplating making to the bankruptcy code in order to
mitigate the financial crisis).
54. Id.
55. If there was a health crisis persisting such as a flu epidemic (such as
the swine flu pandemic that is occurring at the time of the writing of this
paper), would it be efficacious to require a person who lives in an area where
the flu is prevalent to prove they have counseling about how to protect
themselves from the flu before making a vaccine available to that person?
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COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 109(H)

A. Consequences of Failureto Comply-Dismiss or Strike: What
Difference Does It Make?
Section 109(h) sets forth the requirements a person must
meet in order to be a debtor under the Code. If a person files a
petition for bankruptcy protection without having met these
requirements, that person may suffer severe consequences.5 6 To
comply with Section 109(h), a statement of compliance with the
credit counseling requirement (known as Exhibit D) must be filed
with the court along with the bankruptcy petition. The court must
determine how to treat the person who is seeking the protection of
the court when that person has not complied with these
jurisdictional requirements.
There is a split among the courts as to how to handle the case
of an individual who has not complied with Section 109(h)57
because there is no explicit authority within the statute for the
consequences of noncompliance.5 8 As the court in the case of In re
Hess59 reasoned when considering the dismissal of a Chapter 7
proceeding:

56. See, e.g., In re Bolling, No. 08-00746, 2009 WL 435083, at *1-3 (Bankr.
D. D.C. Feb. 9, 2009) (providing an example of a debtor who did not meet the
requirements of 109(h) and whose motion for reconsideration of an order to
disgorge fees was denied by the court). The authors refer to this example as
"The 18 Minute Case," where the debtor began credit counseling at 12:10 p.m.
and the petition was filed at 12:28 p.m. [hence the 18 minutes] in an effort to
stop a foreclosure scheduled for 1:00 p.m. Id. However, the debtor did not
complete counseling until 1:35 p.m., after the time of filing the bankruptcy
petition. Id. The court had dismissed the case and was ordering the attorney
to disgorge the attorney fees. Id. In connection with the dismissal the court
stated, "[s]ection 109(h) is a harsh statute when it comes to a debtor who has
overlooked seeking credit counseling until the last moment before a
bankruptcy petition would have to be filed in order to stop a foreclosure sale."

Id.
57. There is even at least one split among courts within the same district.
See Wyttenbach v. Comm'r Internal Revenue (In re Wyttenbach), 382 B.R. 726,
730 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008) (striking the petition); In re Jones, 352 B.R. 813,
814 (Bankr. S.D. Tex 2006) (dismissing the petition); See generally Lindsay
Sherp, "To Strike or to Dismiss, That is the Question: How Courts Should
Dispose of Bankruptcy Cases Filed By Debtors Who Failed to Obtain Credit
Counseling", 60 BAYLOR L. REV. 317 (2008) (providing a discussion of the
differences between striking the petition and dismissing the case and the
arguments for and against each judicial method of treating individuals who
have failed to comply with 109(h)).
58. In re Wyttenbach, 382 B.R. at 729 (citing In re Henderson, 364 B.R. 906
n.9 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007)).
59. 347 B.R. 489 (Bankr. D.Vt. 2006).
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When Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code through BAPCPA, it
definitely circumscribed bankruptcy courts' discretion in certain
situations. It used unambiguous terms such as "automatic
dismissal" and "the court shall dismiss." . . . It is significant that
there is no such language restricting discretion in § 109(h). This
Court deduces that Congress did not intend to limit the courts'
exercise of discretion under § 707(a) when determining a motion to
dismiss based upon a credit counseling eligibility defect.60
When faced with this issue, courts have resolved these cases
in varying ways: by dismissing the case,61 dismissing the
petition, 62 striking the petition,6 3 or even allowing the debtor to
proceed with the bankruptcy case based upon equitable factors, 64

60. Id. at 497.
61. In re Dixon, 338 B.R. 383, 389 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006); In re DiPinto, 336
B.R. 693, 701 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006); In re Jones, 352 B.R. at 826; In re
Seaman, 340 B.R. 698, 707 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 2006); In re Laporta, 332 B.R.
879, 884 (Bankr. Minn. 2005); In re Cleaver, 333 B.R. 430, 436 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 2005); In re Talib, 335 B.R. 417, 424 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2005); In re
Randolph, 342 B.R. 633, 635 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005).
62. In re Valdez, 335 B.R. 801, 803-04 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005).
Because the petition failed to provide Mirielys Valdez status as a debtor,
the Court will not consider this a dismissed case in which the individual
was the debtor, for purposes of denying the imposition of the automatic
stay in a subsequently filed case pursuant to 11 U.S.C, § 362. Thus, the
Court views the criteria established by 11 U.S.C. § 109 as jurisdictional.
Should Mirielys Valdez proceed to obtain budget and credit counseling
as required under 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(3), she will then be eligible to
become a debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 109 and any petition thereafter filed
in a timely manner, within 180 days after completion of the credit
counseling services, will be treated as her first petition, not subject to 11
U.S.C. § 362 (c)(3) or (c)(4).
Id.
63. See e.g., In re Elmendorf, 345 B.R. 486, 504 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 2006)
(deciding three separate bankruptcy cases on motions to dismiss by the
trustee); In re Henderson, 341 B.R. 789, 792 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006)
(concluding that the bankruptcy court properly denied the motion for
clarification); In re Wyttenbach, 382 B.R. at 728 (affirming the decision of the
bankruptcy court striking the petition and retroactively annulling the stay); In
re Hubbard, 333 B.R. 377, 383 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (striking petitions for
debtors who failed to obtain credit counseling); In re Salazar, 339 B.R. 622,
635 (Bankr. S.D. Tex 2006) (involving two of the putative debtors whose case
had been stricken in In re Hubbard, affirming the decision of the bankruptcy
court striking the petition and determining that no automatic stay arose).
64. See, e.g., In re Enloe, 373 B.R. 123, 133-34 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2007)
(declining to dismiss debtor's case for failure to obtain credit counseling within
180 days before filing their bankruptcy case because of inadequate counsel and
because "there are equitable factors that tip the balance in favor of not
dismissing the case").
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such as substantial compliance6 5 or totality of the circumstances,
to avoid manifest injustice.6 6 The majority of courts have taken the
67
view that dismissing the case is the appropriate remedy,
although some have dismissed the case without discussing the
issue. 68 The courts that have provided reasoning for concluding
that dismissal is the proper remedy have determined that 109(h)
is not a jurisdictional statute such that a debtor who does not
comply with that provision was never a "debtor," and therefore, no
case ever existed.69 The courts that have decided to strike the
petition have generally determined that filing the petition is
synonymous with the commencement of the case. 70 Therefore, if
65. See, e.g., Kistler v. Meza, No. 2:06cv1207-MCE, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
48430, at *6, 8-9 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2007) (affirming the bankruptcy court's
denial of a motion to dismiss debtor's petition because the debtor
demonstrated substantial compliance with 109(h)).
66. See, e.g., In re Nichols, 362 B.R. 88, 96 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(declining to grant a motion to dismiss debtor's case because, based on the
totality of the circumstances, a strict interpretation of 109(h) and dismissal
would result in injustice against the debtor); In re Hess, 347 B.R. 498, 501
(Bankr. D.Vt. 2006) (setting forth a six-criteria "totality of the circumstances"
test for courts to consider when determining whether a debtor's Chapter 7
petition should be dismissed).
67. See generally In re Wyttenbach, 382 B.R. at 729-30 (providing that only
a minority of courts dismiss the petition when the debtor fails to comply with
109(h), but that other courts dismiss the case, such as this court); In re
Seaman, 340 B.R. at 706 n.3 (citing several cases and stating, "[t]his court also
notes that of the thirty-four decisions addressing ineligibility under Section
109(h), to date, thirty-one have resulted in dismissal.").
68. In re Tomco, 339 B.R. 145, 157 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006).
Most of the courts rejecting dismissal of the ineligible debtor's
bankruptcy case have included some commentary in their opinions as to
why striking a petition is a preferred remedy; conversely, the courts
dismissing petitions have offered little reason or explanation as to why
they have done so. This Court agrees with its brethren supporting
dismissal of these types of cases where the petitioner is ineligible to be a
'debtor,' but feels compelled to elaborate on why given the flux of case
law under the 2005 Act.
Id.
69. In re Bass, 365 B.R. 131, 138 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2007). "This court is
also persuaded by those courts that have held that 'eligibility to be a debtor is
not jurisdictional and that until a bankruptcy court determines eligibility, a
case actually exists which cannot thereafter be deemed a nullity by simply
'stiking' [sic] the case as if it never existed."' Id. (quoting In re Wilson, 346 B.R.
59, 64 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2006), citing In re Mills, 341 B.R. 106, 110 (Bankr.
D.D.C. 2006)); In re Seaman, 340 B.R. at 709; In re Tomco, 339 B.R. at 161; In
re Ross, 338 B.R. 134, 136 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006).
70. See e.g., Gargula v. Thompson (In re Thompson), No. 1:06-cv-1033LJM-WTL, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95486, at *3 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2006)
(finding that a voluntary case begins when a proper debtor under the statute
files a petition with the bankruptcy court).
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there is no "case," there can be no "debtor," and the petition would
be stricken as if no case ever commenced.71 And the court in
Wyttenbach v. Commissioner Internal Revenue 72 went one step
further and retroactively annulled the automatic stay. 73
Whether a case is dismissed or stricken can have distinct
consequences. The passage of BAPCPA brought with it significant
consequences when a case is deemed "dismissed."74 Specifically,
newly amended sections 362(c)(3) 75 and 362(c)(4) 76 of the Code
serve to limit or annul the applicability of the most powerful tool
in the bankruptcy process-the automatic stay.77 If a case is
dismissed, the debtor is then penalized upon the filing of any
subsequent bankruptcy case within a year.78 As the court in the
case of In re Salazar79 stated in determining that "striking" was
the proper course of action,
Prior to BAPCPA's enactment, the question of whether to dismiss a
case or strike a petition was a difference without a distinction. It
rarely mattered whether an individual's petition in his last case had
been "stricken" thereby rendering the current case his first (or
second, and so on), or whether it was "dismissed" thereby rendering
his current case the second (or third, and so on). Following the
adoption of BAPCPA, the distinction has meaningful consequences
under § 362(c)(3) and (4). Thus, striking a petition today-with the
intention that its filing never commenced a case-is significant
when applying § 362(c)(3) and (4). Section 362(c)(3) terminates the
automatic stay in a second case pending within the previous year. A
debtor must then prove that he is entitled to an extension of the
stay. See, e.g., In re Rios, 336 B.R. 177, 179-80 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2005). If the debtor had two or more cases pending within the
previous year, the new "case" would render an even harsher result

71. See, e.g., In re Hubbard, 333 B.R. at 388.
72. In re Wyttenbach, 382 B.R. at 729.
73. Id.
74. Adams v. Finley, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81591, at *8-9 (Bankr. S.D.
N.Y. Nov. 3, 2006) (consolidating cases, including In re Elmendorf and stating,
"[t]he draconian consequences of a dismissal could include a resultant limited
applicability of the fundamental protection of the automatic sty under §362(c),
in subsequent filings, merely for an initial failure to comply properly with the
credit counseling requirement.").
75. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3) (2010).
76. Id. § 362(c)(4).
77. Id. § 362(a). In striking three cases of debtors who had not undergone
credit counseling the In re Elmendorf court stated, "Congress did not intend
for ineligible debtors to enjoy the 'most powerful protection' offered by the
Bankruptcy Code-the automatic stay." In re Elmendorf, 345 B.R. at 502
(citing In re Salazar, 339 B.R. at 629, 630).
78. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2) (2010).
79. In re Salazar, 339 B.R. at 635.
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under § 362(c)(4), with no stay at all unless the debtor proves
entitlement to a stay. See, e.g., In re Toro-Arcila, 334 B.R. 224
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005).80

Thus, if a case is "dismissed," a second filing of a new case
within the previous year would normally mandate that the
automatic stay terminate within thirty days after the date the
case is filed, unless the debtor can prove entitlement to an
extension of the stay. 8 ' Furthermore, a third or subsequent filing
would normally result in the debtor not being able to benefit from
the protections of the automatic stay at all.82
On the other hand, if a case is "stricken," it will be deemed
that no case was ever filed. 83 Indeed, in one case the court even
granted the "debtor's" motion to waive the filing fee because no
case had ever commenced. 84 The putative "debtor" will be reverted
to the pre-filing status of that debtor, without the protection of the
automatic stay, and subject to whatever creditor actions and
claims that would have been available to any such creditors, as if
the "debtor" had never filed. Thus, any creditor actions against the
putative debtor that might have been commenced prior to,
concurrent with, or subsequent to the alleged "filing," would not be
protected by the U.S. bankruptcy laws.
B. How to Comply with the 180 "Day"Period: What Does
"Day"Mean?
Section 109(h) requires that the requisite credit counseling

occur "during the 180-day period preceding the date of filing of the
petition by such individual . . . .."8 In a consequentially significant
number of cases, individuals have filed their cases on the same
day as the day that the individual obtained the credit counseling.86

80. Id. at 633.
81. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2) (2006).
82. Id. §362(c)(4).
83. See, e.g., In re Hubbard, 333 B.R. at 388 (holding that no case was
commenced by the filing of the petitions and thus there was no case to
dismiss).
84. In re Doll, 369 B.R. 104, 105 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 2007); but cf. In re
Johnson, No. 08-60998, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 1081, at *4-5 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
2008) (involving the dismissal of the debtor's case where the court ordered the
debtor to pay the filing fee).
85. 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(1) (2010).
86. In re Wise, 415 B.R. 579, 583 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2009); In re
Hammonds, No. 08-40928-JJR-13, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 2929, at *14 (Bankr.
N.D. Ala. 2008); In re DeHoog, No. 13-08-12312 SF, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 3364,
at *5 (Bankr. D. N.M. 2008); In re Francisco, 390 B.R. 700, 705 (B.A.P. 10th
Cir. 2008); In re Gossett, 369 B.R. 361, 365 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007); In re
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Thus, the issue becomes whether the credit counseling occurred
"preceding the date" the case was filed. If it is deemed not to have
occurred, the individual is "out" of bankruptcy;87 if it is deemed
that the credit counseling did occur in a timely fashion, the
individual becomes a "debtor" in bankruptcy.8 8
To illustrate, Alpha gets credit counseling on January 3,
2009, at 8 a.m. Alpha files the bankruptcy petition with the court
at 9 a.m. on the same day the credit counseling takes place in
order to avoid a foreclosure scheduled for 10 a.m., all on that same
day. (Alpha had been attempting to reach an agreement with the
creditor up to the time of filing.) Depending upon the court in
which Alpha has filed the bankruptcy case, Alpha may no longer
own his residence.
There are two lines of cases upon which the courts are
divided: (1) the "plain language" cases8 9 and (2) the "bright line"
cases.90 The courts following the "plain language" line hold that
the plain language of the statute dictates that "date" within the
meaning of the statute means a full calendar day, 91 which would
eliminate a filing that occurs the same day as the day the case was
filed. On the other hand, the "bright line" courts hold that the line
is drawn at the moment of filing the bankruptcy petition, such
that any credit counseling that may have occurred prior to that
moment is in compliance with the statute. 92
Courts using the "plain language" rationale have based their
reasoning upon dictionary meanings of the word "date"93 and upon
bankruptcy Rule 9006(a), 94 the rule for computing time. 95 At least

Barbaran, 365 B.R, 333, 337 (Bankr. D.C. 2007); In re Swanson, No. 06-00968TLM, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3639, at *8 (Bankr. Idaho 2006); In re Moore, 359
B.R. 665, 673 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2006); In re Hudson, 352 B.R. 391, 396
(Bankr. D. Md. 2006); In re Cole, 347 B.R. 70, 75 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2006); In
re Toccaline, No. 06-20218, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 1644, at *8 (Bankr. D. Conn
2006); In re Spears, 355 B.R. 116, 120 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006); In re Warren,
339 B.R. 475, 479-80 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2006).
87. In re Wise, 415 B.R. at 579-81 (holding that the debtor must have had

credit counseling at least the day before filing).
88. In re Barbaran,365 B.R. at 338 (stating that the debtor must have had
credit counseling at the moment of filing).
89. See, e.g., In re Francisco, 390 B.R. at 702 (citing several cases and
resolving the split within that circuit by following "bright line" cases).
90. See, e.g., id. at 702 (resolving the circuit split in favor of the "bright
line" cases).
91. Id. at 702-03.
92. Id. at 703.
93. Id. at 702, 703.
94. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(a).
95. In re Francisco,390 B.R. at 703.
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one court has also reasoned that the legislative intent of Congress
suggests that a debtor should have an opportunity for a "waiting
period" to make an "informed choice" after obtaining the
counseling to analyze the information obtained during the
counseling session and decide whether bankruptcy is the best
option to pursue. 96
The "bright line" courts look at specific provisions of the Code
that use the phrase "date of filing of the petition," noting that
these provisions refer to this time period as "the moment of
filing."97 These courts have also specifically rejected the view that
Congress intended that there be a waiting period after obtaining
the counseling before filing bankruptcy.9 8
So where does Alpha stand? Alpha obviously would fare best
if the bankruptcy petition were filed in those courts following the
"bright line" reasoning. Alpha engaged in credit counseling just
one hour prior to filing the petition. The "bright line" is drawn at 9
a.m., the moment of filing, thus Alpha is safe and foreclosure upon
the house will be stayed. If Alpha filed the bankruptcy petition in
a court following the "plain language" line of reasoning, the case
would likely be dismissed or stricken due to failure to comply with
Section 109(h), and the creditor would be free to proceed with
foreclosure.
III. THE So-CALLED "SAFE HARBOR": 99 EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES

A. What Is Required?
Unless Alpha qualifies for one of the limited exceptions to
obtaining credit counseling, 0 0 Alpha may seek refuge in the "safe
harbor" provision of Section 109(h) by obtaining a "temporary
exemption" pursuant to subsection 109(h)(3).101 To do so, Alpha

96. In re Cole, 347 B.R. 70, 72, 76 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2006).
97. In re Francisco,390 B.R. at 703-04.
98. Id. at 705; In re Warren, 339 B.R. 475, 480 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2006).
99. See generally In re Thompson, 344 B.R. 899, 908 (Bankr. S. D. Ind.
2006) (denying the U.S. Trustee's motion for reconsideration of the lower
court's decision to strike the debtor's petition for failure to comply with §
109(h) instead of dismissing the case for non-compliance).
100. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(2), (4) (setting forth the limited bases upon
which a debtor may be exempted from complying with the credit counseling
requirement of section 109(h)). The exemption includes where there are no
approved credit counseling agencies within the district and where a debtor is
unable to complete the counseling due to incapacity, disability, or active
military duty in a military combat zone. Id.
101. Id. § 109(h)(3).
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must prepare an Exhibit D10 2 to the bankruptcy petition to certify
all of the following (summarizing the statute): (1) Describe the
exigent circumstances; (2) state that she requested credit
counseling services from an approved agency, but was unable to
obtain the services during the five-day period beginning on the
date she made that request; and (3) the certification must satisfy
the court.
Yet in spite of the ostensibly simplistic manner in which these
three requirements are set forth, the "safe harbor" seems far from
safe. Navigating through this statutory murkiness requires a
skilled hand along with a bit of luck (the luck of landing in a
"debtor friendly" jurisdiction); and a favorable aligning of the
debtor's state of affairs to appease the applicable court. Otherwise,
the hopeful debtor may be facing a rocky course.
B. The Five-day Period:Must the Debtor Wait Five Days to File?
One obstacle is the five-day period required by this
provision. 103 The courts are split as to whether the five-day period
is intended to run pre-petition.10 4 There are two lines of reasoning
102. Victoria L. VanZandt, The Exigent Circumstances Exception to the PrePetition Credit Counseling Requirement Under the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005: Exigent or Extreme?, 6
DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L. J. 265, 284 (2008).

Labeled 'Exhibit D,' this portion of the Voluntary Petition now requires

every individual debtor to check a box, indicating he or she, or, if the
case is joint, each debtor has completed and signed an Exhibit D that is
attached and made a part of the petition. Exhibit D, adopted in October
of 2006, entitled 'Exhibit D-Individual Debtor's Statement of
Compliance with Credit Counseling Requirement,' requires a debtor to
choose one of five boxes. The five boxes are: (1) a statement that credit
counseling was obtained within the 180 days pre-petition and that a
certificate from an approved credit counseling agency is attached; (2) a
statement that credit counseling was obtained within the 180 days prepetition and that a certificate from an approved credit counseling agency
is not attached (therefore, further requiring a debtor to obtain the
certificate and file the same with the court within fifteen days); (3) a
statement seeking a temporary waiver under § 109(h)(3) (therefore,
requiring the debtor to attach a motion for determination by the court);
(4) a statement demonstrating that the debtor is not required to
complete the counseling because he or she meets the statutory
requirement of § 109(h)(4); or (5) a statement demonstrating the debtor
is not required to complete the counseling because he or she meets the
statutory requirements of § 109(h)(2). The end of Exhibit D includes
certification language, similar to that found in § 1746 and requires the
debtor's signature.

Id.
103. 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(3)A(ii).
104. See In re Afolabi, 343 B.R. 195, 199 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2006) (holding
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courts have employed. In the view of some courts the five-day
period precludes the debtor from filing until the five-day period
has completely elapsed, treating it as a "waiting period." 0 5
Conversely, other courts have held that the debtor may file at any
time during the five-day period. 0 6 We will term these courts the
"request period" courts.
If we follow the logic of the "request period" courts, which
allows the debtor to file bankruptcy at any time during the fiveday period after making the request for credit counseling, a second
issue arises; one which was dealt with in the case of In re
7
Giambrone.O
The question raised by In re Giambrone was

whether the debtor would be compelled to delay filing bankruptcy
until the five days has elapsed when there is a foreclosure
scheduled before the five-day period elapses,108 even though the

that the credit counseling must received be pre-petition); In re Dipinto, 336
B.R. 693, 700 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006) (holding that the credit counseling
requirement may be satisfied post-petition).
105. In re Afolabi, 343 B.R. at 199. The In re Afolabi court held that a debtor
must attempt to obtain credit counseling at least five days in advance of filing.
Id. The court cites cases for and against requiring a debtor to have a five-day
waiting period stating:
Arguably, § 109(h)(3)(A)(ii) is awkwardly worded, making it unclear
whether a debtor is required merely to request credit counseling prior to
filing for bankruptcy relief or whether such request must be made at
least five days prior to filing. Contra DiPinto, 336 B.R. at 699 (finding
that even though Congress likely intended the five-day period to run
pre-petition, the language of the statute unambiguously provides
otherwise). While courts are unfortunately not in agreement on this
issue, in this Court's opinion, the most logical reading of the statute
dictates that debtors must attempt to obtain credit counseling at least
five days in advance of filing. See In re Carey, 341 B.R. 798; In re
Cleaver, 333 B.R. at 435 (noting in dicta that § 109(h)(3)(A)(ii) would
appear to require a five-day waiting period before a debtor could file a
petition together with the certification). To hold otherwise would render
the statute's reference to a "5-day period" nonsensical. If a debtor is able
to satisfy § 109(h)(3)(A)(ii) by showing that he unsuccessfully requested
credit counseling the day before filing a bankruptcy petition, then what
relevance does the 5-day period have?

Id.
106. In re Giambrone, 365 B.R. 386, 391-92 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 2007); In re
Dipinto, 336 B.R. at 700.
107. 365 B.R. 386 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 2007).
108. See also Laura B. Bartell, From Debtors' Prisons to PrisonerDebtors:
Credit Counseling for the Incarcerated, 24 BANK. DEv. J. 15, 21 (2008)
(referencing In re Gambrione and stating, "[a]t least one court has declined to
give effect to the literal language of this provision, suggesting that the five-day
period referred to in § 109(h)(3)(A)(ii) is intended to mean five days or the
period between the request for credit counseling and the time of the
bankruptcy filing compelled by exigent circumstances, whichever is shorter.").
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debtor has a credit counseling appointment within that five-day
period. To examine both issues we refer to the following
illustrations involving Beta.
For the first issue involving whether the statute imposes a
five-day waiting period, Beta requests the counseling within the
five-day period and obtains the counseling on the third day of that
period. Beta then proceeds to file bankruptcy on the fourth day of
the five-day period. Courts requiring that there be a five-day
waiting period would find that Beta is not in compliance with the
statute,10 9 whereas the courts interpreting the statute as a
"request period" would not find the debtor failed to comply with
this Code provision on this basis.110
For the second issue, assume Beta again requests the credit
counseling during the five-day period, except that Beta is unable
to obtain the required counseling until the fifth day of that fiveday period. A foreclosure or other creditor action which would
irreparably alter the debtor's financial status quo is scheduled to
occur the third day of that five-day period. Beta decides to file
bankruptcy on the second day of that five-day period. For courts
that interpret the statute to require a five-day waiting period, this
is no issue at all because the debtor would not be able to comply
with the statute by filing prior to the end of the five-day period."n
However, for the courts that treat the five-day period as a "request
period," a court may decide, as the In re Giambrone court did, to
deem the debtor in compliance with the statute, 112 particularly
where there are equitable factors such as in In re Giambrone
where the debtor eventually did obtain the counseling, albeit postpetition.

C. What Are Exigent Circumstances?
What prospective debtors may come upon in navigating
through the "safe harbor" provision is the fact that there are
differing opinions among the courts as to how the "safe harbor"
provision is to be interpreted and applied. Some courts hold that
the exigency must relate purely to the inability to obtain credit
counseling without regard to the financial circumstance that may
be causing the debtor to file for bankruptcy. 113 Other courts will

In re Afolabi, 343 B.R. at 195.
In re Dipinto, 336 B.R. at 699-701.
In re Afolabi, 343 B.R. at 199-200.
In re Giambrone, 365 B.R. at 392.
In re Richardson, No. 07-42881, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 4153, at *4-5
(Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2007) (quoting In re Afolabi, 343 B.R. at 198). This Court
agrees with the later line of cases inasmuch as the proper focus under §109(h)
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
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look to the underlying financial circumstance that is creating the
exigent situation for the individual. 114 Additionally, for those
courts that do give consideration to the underlying precipitating
event, there is disagreement as to what type of event should be
deemed exigent, and/or the context in which such event should be
given exigent status. In the view of some courts, if a debtor had a
certain amount of notice of the threatened negative creditor action,
the creditor action is no longer considered "exigent."115 The
following chart, which begins of the next page, examines certain
cases involving exigent circumstances where courts have dealt
with these issues to provide a comparative analysis as to how
these matters have been treated.

is not on the circumstances that precipitated the bankruptcy filing, "but on
whether those circumstances or any other prevented the debtor from being
able to obtain credit counseling prior to filing for bankruptcy." Id.
114. See In re Richardson, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 4153, at * 3-4 (citing cases
that do not agree with this court's holding stating, "[s]ome courts have viewed
an imminent foreclosure sale as an exigent circumstance."); In re Henderson,
364 B.R. at 909, n.3 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007) (stating in dicta that a nonjudicial foreclosure sale of a family home under Texas law is an exigent
circumstance); In re Henderson, 339 B.R. 34, 38-39 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 2006)
(showing that an "impending sale of home or sole means of transportation are
examples of potentially exigent circumstances warranting this temporary ...
relief."); In re Romero, 349 B.R. 616, 620 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2006) (determining
that "looming wage garnishment constitutes exigent circumstances."); In re
Hubbard, 333 B.R. at 384 (showing that exigent circumstances exist when a
debtor faces loss of family home or permanent loss of sole means of
transportation unless immediate bankruptcy relief is granted); In re Childs,
335 B.R. 623, 630-31 (Bankr. D. Md. 2005) (demonstrating that imminent sale
of property at foreclosure andlor imminent eviction from residence are exigent
circumstances).
115. See generally In re Richardson, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 4153, at *4
(stating, "[o]thers have found that because the foreclosure process provides
considerable notice to homeowners, the foreclosure sale allows no excuse for
procrastination in seeking the protection of bankruptcy."); In re Rodriguez, 336
B.R. 462, 474 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2005) ("Waiting ... until the eve of creditor
action before addressing the §109(h) prerequisite for filing bankruptcy makes
the exigency rather self-inflicted."); In re Dixon, 338 B.R. at 388-90 (holding
that a foreclosure sale does not merit deferral of credit counseling
requirement); In re DiPinto, 336 B.R. at 698, 701 (holding also that a
foreclosure sale does not merit deferral of credit counseling requirement); In re
Afolabi, 343 B.R. at 198 (holding again that a foreclosure sale does not merit
deferral of credit counseling requirement).
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DEBTOR/
DEBTOR

Musgrove

Bolling

CLAIMED
CITATION

EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCE

OTHER
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COURT
DISPOSITION/
CC FACTOR

72009rv .
786
D. D.C.

Sick, in
hospital.

not disabled
per 109(h)(4).

Waiver
denied.
Debtor did
not get CC.

2009 B.L.
340
D. D.C.

Foreclosure at
1:00 p.m. same
day as filing.

Started CC
before filing;
finished after.

Dismissed.
Atty. ordered
to disgorge
fees. CC not

Court said not
exigent; debtor

completed.

Hughes

Houston

Richardson

Sherry

2009 B.L.
339
D. D.C.

2008 B.L.
1829
E.D. Va.,

Tried internet
CC-site
failed; tried
phone-long
wait.

Wage

Eviction might
occur w/n five
days.

2008 B.L.
432
D. D.C.

Debts
unbearable; #
of dependents.

2008 B.L.
2666
W. Div.
Iowa

Debtor did not
know needed
certification of
exigency.

2008 B.L.
2628
E
Oh E.
N.D.N.D.
Oh.,

erf
ale
Debtor also
saysexigency,
pay CC fee,.
t g
in a prior case.
-_

impending
eviction would
generally be
exigent.
Court said
does not rise to
level of
exency

Waiver
denied.
Court could
not look at
exigency.
Debtor did
not get CC.
Dismissed.
Debtor did
not request
CC.
Denied
Motion to
Reconsider
Disisl

exigency.

Dismissal.

Court said not
exigent.

Dismissed.
Debtor did
not request
CC.

Court said
financial
hardship not
basis for
esp.
xgny s.
when agencies
must charge
based on

._ . Lability to pay.

Dismissed.
Exemption
denied.
Debtor did
Dbo i
not request
CC in this
case.
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Court said

2008 B.L.
.

Bain

2190
E.D. Va.,
Alex

2008 B.L.
3603
E.D. Va.,

Impending
Foreclosure

Impending
Foreclosure

Alex

20
Shea
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Coutnsid

Dismissed.

impening
does
al
qualify as
exigent.

Debtor did
not request

Court admits
C unlil
C
result in rec.

Dismissed.
Debtor did
not request

other than
bankruptcy.

B

E.D. Va.,

ex Va.

Alex

Lost job,
eviction, auto

Court assumes
these risks

Waiver
Denied.
Debtor did

repossession.

imminent.

not request
cc.

Richardson,
L.

2007 B.L.
4153
E.D. Tex.,
Sherman

Impending
Foreclosure.

Court said
Debtor could

Debtor had

have sought

twenty-one
days notice.

counseling so
not exigent.

Waiver
Denied.
Debtor did
not request
CC. Court
says focus
hud eo
cirumstances
circumstances

preventing
CC.

Court said not

Magnusson

2007 B.L.
4516
D. N.D.

Hailemichael

IRS tax lien
and impending
eviction by IRS.

exigent
because Debtor

Unemployed.
Unempoyed.

Court said no

2007 B.L.

Residing in a

3562
E.D. Va.,

homeless
shelter for a

Alex

week prior to
filing,

had ninety
days notice of
tax deficiency.

showing
Debtor could
not have

2007 B.L.
2946
D. Col.

Impending
Foreclosure

Dismissed.
Debtor did
not request
CC.

delayed filing.

Debtor got CC
189 days prior.

Enloe

Dismissed.
Debtor did
not request
CC until day
after filing.

Court found
delay in filing
was due to
attempt to sell
home to avoid
foreclosure

Dismissal
denied.
Court found
equitable
factors in
favor of not
dismissing.
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Court said not

Vian

2007 B.L.

Persistent

2072
D. Minn.

dunning by a
few creditors.

exigent and
Debtor did not
.
lawyertsgte
lawyer signed

Dismissed.

it.

Gossett

Giambrone

2007 B.L.
1340
N.D. Ill., E.

2007 B.L.
1058
W.D. NY

Vehicle already

Impending
Foreclosure.
Filed petition
evening before
foreclosure.

Court said
Debtor
intended to

Dismissed.
Debtor got
CC same day

surrender
vehicle.

as filing, so
not 180 days.

Court said
exigent.
Debtor did CC
five days after
filing. Court
said Debtor
should not
have to delay
until get CC
because Debtor

Granted
extension to
get CC.

demonstrated
unable to
obtain CC
before the sale
and during
five-day period
beginning from
moment of the
request.
Court said
exigent. Court

Henderson

2007 B.L.

Impending

1042
N.D. Tex.

Foreclosure

noted Debtor's
attempted to
get CC by
trying all
weekend by
internet but no
connection
with only
address given
by atty. and no
phone number
to try.

Granted
extension to
get CC.
Debtor
requested CC
but did not.
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p

Y -!

Order
Dismissing
Affirmed.
Debtor
requested but

Dixon

338 B.R.
383
8th Cir.
BAP
2006

Impending
Foreclosure

Court said not
exigent
because Debtor
had advance
notice.

could not
obtain CC,
after finding
out from
bankruptcy
attorney she
contacted the
day before
filing that it
was required.

Romero

2006 B.L.
2277

Wage
Garnishment

336 B.R..Deid
DiPinto

693
E.D. Pa.

2006 B.L.
136

Denied

exigent even
though Debtor
had advance
knowledge of

Motion to
Dismiss.
Debtor
requested CC

garnishment.

but no time.

Court said not

Waiver
Denied.

knowledge.

Dismissed.
Debtor did
not request
CC.

Wage

Court said not

Dismissed.
Debtor

Garnishment of
Husband; Wife

exigent.
Debtor had

requested but
did not obtain

lost job.

advance
knowledge.

CC before
filing.

Impending
Foreclosure

2006

Anderson

Court said

exigent.
Debtor had
advance

Dismissed.
Motion for

339 B.R.
Burrell

669
W. D. Mich.
2006

Impending
Foreclosure

Court said
exigent.

Add. Time
Denied.
Debtor stated
she requested
CC but failed
to state
unable to
obtain CC
during the
five day
period.
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Waiver

Rodriguez

36 B.R.
462
D. Idaho
2005

Boilerplate

Court said not

allegations re.
impending
third
thr
garnishment.

exigent.
Debtor did not
sign
inget
certification.

Denied.
Dismissed.
Debtor
attempted to
get
not

CC, but

successful.
335 B.R.
Valdez

Hubbard

801
S.D. Fla.
2005
333 B.R.
377
S.D. Tex.
2005

Impending
Foreclosure

Needed to
reclaim sole
transportation.

Court said not
exigent. Court
said Debtor
had
opportunity to
obtain CC.
Court said
exigent.

Dismissed.
Debtor did
not request
CC.
Stricken.
Debtor did
not request
CC.

*CC= Credit counseling referring to the credit counseling
required by the Section 109(h)
**B.L. = Bankr. LEXIS (citation to LEXIS)
"Debtor did not request CC" normally means debtor did not
make the certification required by Section 109(h)(3).
For brevity purposes some of the salient facts may have been
omitted, however the authors have attempted to utilize this format
to give a skeletal comparison of these matters. It is acknowledged
that in some cases it may be necessary to go to the case to get a
full picture.
IV. TODAY'S ECONOMIC PARADIGM AS APPLIED TO THE
DISTRESSED HOMEOWNER

A. The Subprime Mortgage Mess: A Simplified Backdrop
While the current U.S. subprime mortgage crisis and
subsequent recession is the result of a series of complex events
surrounded by a myriad of opinions on the correct actions of
government and private decision-makers, a simplified description
of events is necessary to understand how the sequence of events
over the past few years could be considered exigent circumstances
as applied to the distressed homeowner.
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The Federal Housing Administration (FHA), created by
Congress at the height of the Great Depression by the Housing Act
of 1934, was established to insure loans on private residential
mortgages.116 While default risk was largely mitigated through
FHA insurance, as interest rates rose, the value of the loan
portfolio fell (that is, interest rate risk).117 Accordingly, the federal
government created the Federal National Mortgage Association
(FNMA or "Fannie Mae") to purchase FHA loans at face value,
thus giving banks the capital they needed in exchange for loans
they did not wish to hold, effectively eliminating interest rate risk
for originating banks.118 In 1968, Congress privatized Fannie
Mae,119 and in 1970, Congress created the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC or "Freddie Mac").120 Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac, both private companies with "implicit backing of
the U.S. Government," became known as government-sponsored

116. National Housing Act, 73 Pub. L. No. 479, § 2, 48 Stat. 1246, 1246-49
(1934); Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory StructuredFinance, 28 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2185, 2195-96 (2007) (stating that this housing act guaranteed that home
mortgage lenders were protected from the borrower's credit risk and any risk
of housing price deterioration); Alexander von Hoffman, A Study in
Contradictions:The Origins and Legacy of the Housing Act of 1949, 11 HOUS.
POLICY DEBATE 299, 301 (2000) (stating, "[t]he National Housing Act of 1934
established the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) to provide insurance
for private residential mortgages and home improvements .... .").
117. THE HANDBOOK OF FIXED INCOME SEC. 968 (Frank J. Fabozzi ed.,
McGraw-Hill 7th ed. 2005) (defining interest-rate risk as "the potential impact
on a bond portfolio value of any given change in the location and shape of the
yield curve.").
118. Peterson, supra note 116, at 2195-96 (stating that this housing act
guaranteed that home mortgage lenders were protected from the borrower's
credit risk and any risk of housing price deterioration); Robert Hockett, A
Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means: Values, Constraints, and
Finance in the Design of a Comprehensive and Contemporary American
"Ownership Society", 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 45, 110-14 (2005) (discussing
Congress' move to "insure the lending institutions" by providing secondary
markets for securities trade and noting that, through Fannie Mae, Freddie
Mac, and the Government National Mortgage Association, or Ginnie Mae, the
FHA's scheme "complet[ed] the market for housing credit and housing creditrisk bearing, thereby maximizing the availability of credit" and lowering the
cost of such credit to home-buyers).
119. Richard W. Bartke, Fannie Mae and the Secondary Mortgage Market,
66 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 30 (1971) (discussing President Johnson's proposal to
Congress that Fannie Mae be privatized because "secondary market operation
is largely a private function" and thus, it "ought to be performed by the private
sector.").
120. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Act, Pub. L. No. 91-351,
§§ 300-10, 84 Stat. 451, 451-58 (1970); see generally Richard Scott Carnell,
Handlingthe Failureof a Government-SponsoredEnterprise, 80 WASH L. REV.
565, 570-96 (2005) (discussing the creation and functionality of GSEs).
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enterprises (GSEs).121
Seven years later, Congress passed the Community
Reinvestment Act of 1977, which encouraged banks to increase
lending to low- and moderate-income individuals. 122 While lenders
were encouraged to lend to individuals not meeting typical FHA
and conventional standards, no entity stood ready to purchase
these loans. 123 The lender would bear both the default risk and the
interest rate risk and could get only moderate relief from default
risk through private mortgage insurance.124 Recognizing that
lenders would not be active in the subprime market without the
ability to offload these mortgages, fifteen years later Congress
passed the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and
Soundness Act of 1992,125 which encouraged the GSEs to increase
their support of affordable housing and opened the door to the
purchase and securitization of subprime mortgages. 126

121. Carnell, supra note 120, at 570-71 (explaining that while investors
perceive GSEs as implicitly backed by the federal government, GSEs do not
form any part of the federal government and "lack the ability to bind the
government financially."); THE HANDBOOK OF FIXED INCOME SEC., supra note
117, at 245 (defining government sponsored enterprises as "privately owned
and operated entities chartered by Congress to decrease the cost of funding for
certain sectors of the economy" where "the agencies' securities are thought to
have an implicit government guarantee.").
122. 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a) (2006); THE FED. RESERVE BD., COMTY.
REINVESTMENT ACT, (2008) http://www.federalreserve.gov/dccacral; Robert B.
Avery, Raphael W. Bostic & Glenn B. Canner, Economic Commentary, The
Performance and Profitabilityof CRA-Related Lending, FED. RESERVE BANK
OF CLEVELAND, Nov. 2000, http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/Commentary/
2000/1100.htm.
123. See generally Thomas E. Plank, Regulationand Reform of the Mortgage
Market and the Nature of Mortgage Loans: Lessons from Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, 60 S.C. L. REV. 779,779-85 (2009) (discussing the distressed
markets and economic climate of the 1960s and 1970s).
124. Id. at 794-97 (discussing the risks associated with ownership of a
mortgage loan in the context of the savings and loan crash of the late 1970s
and 1980s).
125. 12 U.S.C. §§ 4501-4651 (2006).
126. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Speech at the Community Affairs Research Conference, The Community
Reinvestment Act: Its Evolution and New Challenges (Mar. 30, 2007),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speechlBernanke20070
330a.htm (implementing the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety
and Soundness Act of 1992, which set low- and moderate-income housing goals
and an attendant enforcement scheme); see also Plank, supra note 123, at 79697 (describing the "dramatic shift" in the percentage of mortgage loans held by
savings institutions in the 1970s and the percentage held by similar
institutions in 2006). "Savings institutions held more than 50% of all singlefamily mortgage loans" from 1958-1979, but by late 2006, "savings
institutions held only 7.8% of all first-lien single-family mortgage loans." Id. at
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Historically low interest rates encouraged development of
high-yield products like low documentation, no documentation,
and piggyback loans, and lending standards were greatly
relaxed. 127 Most people had the ability to qualify at teaser rates,
and regulators did not police these products or the institutions
that created them. 128 The loan originators also did not care about
credit quality because they quickly sold newly created loans to the
GSEs.1 29 Consequently, as shown in the figure below, U.S.
homeownership began to rise in the late 1990s and early 2000s,
peaking at just under seventy percent in 2004.130

U.S. Homeownership Rates
1965 - 2008 (%)
70.0
68.0
66.0
64.0
62.0
60 .0

797-98. On the other hand, "GSEs held 44.4% of all first-lien single family
mortgage loans" in 2006, and due to the declining confidence in mortgagebacked securities, the number of loans held by GSEs grew to 51.6% by fall
2009. Id.
127. Breaking New Grounds in U.S. Mortgage Lending, FED. DEPOSIT INS.
CORP. OUTLOOK, Summer 2006, available at http://www.fdic.gov/banklanalyti
FEDERAL
[hereinafter
callregional/ro20062q/na/2006_summerO4.html
DEPOSIT].
128. Id.
129. Cf. Robert Hockett, Bringing it All Back Home: How to Save Main
Street, Ignore K Street, and Thereby Save Wall Street, 36 FORDHAM L. REV.
427, 439 (2009) (positing several theories for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's
aggressive pursuit and quick incurrence of risky mortgages that did not
comply with FHA regulations, such as the mortgages' immense profitability,
the implicit guarantees of such mortgage loans by the federal government, and
"active pressure" from officials of the Clinton and Bush administrations); See
also FEDERAL DEPOSIT, supra note 127 (noting increased concern among
mortgage lenders in 2006 about non-traditional mortgage loan quality).
130. See U.S. Census Bureau, Housing Vacancies and Homeownership,
Homeownership Rates for the U.S. and Regions: 1965 to Present,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/historic/index.html (last visited
Mar. 19, 2011) (providing homeownership rates by quarter).
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As shown in the figure below, the rise in homeownership was
accompanied by substantial growth in U.S. home mortgage debt. 131
Individuals began to purchase homes that were more expensive
than they could ordinarily afford under previous lending
standards, and investors began to speculate on housing prices by
flipping properties.132 Consumers demanded more and more
capital, loan products continued to get pushed beyond reasonable
limits, investors chased returns by buying mortgage-backed
securities of all types, and the feedback loop repeated as capital
returned to lenders to create more extreme mortgage contracts.133
In fact, at the writing of this Article, the GSEs held or backed
more than half, or just under $5.3 trillion, of the more than $10
trillion in U.S. home mortgage debt.134

131. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM,
FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE: FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE
UNITED STATES (2009), http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/zl/20090312/da
ta.htm [hereinafter BOARD OF GOVERNORS] (showing the amount of U.S. home

mortgage debt by quarter).
132. Harry Markowitz, Proposals Concerning the Current FinancialCrisis,
FIN. ANALYSTS J. 25, 25 Jan.-Feb. 2009; Cf. Moran, supra note 40, at 15, 16
(explaining that "[n]ontraditional financing, including mortgage commitments
such as adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) and interest-only mortgages which
vary from the traditional thirty-year fixed rate mortgage, allowed buyers to
qualify for homes they otherwise could not afford under traditional fixed-rate
mortgage lending guidelines.").
133. See FEDERAL DEPOSIT, supra note 127 (recalling that lenders packaged
nontraditional mortgages in the 2000s, fulfilling growing consumer demand
and "introducing considerable new liquidity" for investors in the mortgage
market).
134. See INT'L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT:
FINANCIAL STRESS AND DELEVERAGING: MACROFINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND
POLICY (2008), http://imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2008/02/pdfltext.pdf (stating
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac "have a combined $5.3 trillion in mortgage
risk."); BOARD OF GOVERNORS, supra note 131 (calculating just over $11
trillion in U.S. mortgage debt in the fourth quarter of 2008).
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B. Housing Prices Have Dropped: Owners Are Losing Equity;
Banks Are Not Lending
Home prices began to level off in 2005 and subsequently
declined as subprime borrowers began to default.as As shown in
the figure below, the base period (index = 100) Standard & Poor's
Case-Shiller Home Price Index is the first quarter of 2000.136 By
the first quarter of 2006, the average price of a home in the CaseShiller Composite- 10, a composite of ten geographically diverse
U.S. cities, had doubled. 3 However, modest increases in interest
rates and the 2005 hurricane season's impact on energy prices
subsequently slowed the real estate market.as

135. See FEDERAL DEPOSIT, supra note 127 (predicting in 2006 that
mortgage delinquency would become a problem, especially for subprime
borrowers).
136. STANDARD & POOR'S, S&P/CASE-SHILLER HOME PRICE INDICES (2009),
http://www2.standardandpoors.comspflpdflindex/CSHomePrice History0331
14.xls [hereinafter CASE-SCHILLER].
137. Id. (calculating a value of 222.46 for the first quarter of 2006 compared
with a value of 100 for the first quarter of 2000).
138. Cf. Eduardo Porter & Vikas Bajaj, Economy Sets Fastest Pace Since the
Summer of 2003, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2006, at C3 (noting that economists
predicted a thirty to forty percent drop in the housing market by the third
quarter of 2006, resulting in part from "Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and a
spike in oil prices, [which] sharply slowed economic growth to 1.7 percent.").
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Home prices began to slide in late 2006, beginning a steep
decline that has extended into 2009. In fact, the average home in
the Case-Shiller Composite-10 suffered a staggering twenty-seven
percent price decline from December 2006 to December 2008,
devastating home equity particularly for those who purchased
their homes in the mid-2000s.139
Suddenly, the financial world found itself with an array of
newly-created financial instruments that were based on the
debt obligations
(CDOs),
mortgage boom: collateralized
collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs), and credit default
swaps (CDSs).140 Unfortunately, few people understood these
instruments and how they were all intricately linked. 141 The
combination of market-to-market accounting, which required

139. See CASE-SHILLER, supra note 136 (documenting the decline in home
prices month by month).
140. See Moran, supra note 40, at 36-43 (describing the "complex financial
instruments" generated on Wall Street, such as mortgage-backed securities,
collateralized mortgage obligations, and credit default swaps which "allow[ed]
banks to expand their lending business by originating more loans while
facilitating income streams for capital markets.").
141. Markowitz, supra note 132, at 25; see also Moran, supra note 40, at 42,
43 (opining that the lack of regulatory supervision over credit-default markets,
coupled with an overreliance on the credit ratings of the securities and
financial firms selling them, meant that even the government regulators
"lacked any means to assess the amount of risk in the system"). Some scholars
posit that the financial crisis actually began in July 2007. Id. at 32. Although
the fallout cannot be attributed to one determining cause, a major factor to
lever the housing market bubble "was the financial innovations that developed
on Wall Street as a result of securitization." Id.
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financial institutions to write down assets to fire-sale prices and
the inability to determine the extent of a financial institution's
holdings of these devalued assets, led to a sudden decrease in
system-wide liquidity.142 As borrowers began to default, the GSEs
were forced to cover the losses to pay off the bonds secured by the
defunct mortgages; thus, their financial cushion flattened.143 In
2008, the GSEs needed more capital to cover the growing number
of defaults of recently originated subprime mortgages, but capital
became increasingly difficult to obtain in a worsening economic
environment.1 44
C. Foreclosuresand BankruptciesHave Risen
Each quarter the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA)
releases its National Delinquency Survey (NDS). Since 1953, the
MBA has administered the NDS, which "covers 45 million loans on
one- to four-unit residential properties."145 "Loans surveyed [are]

142. See Moran, supra note 40, at 44, 45 (surmising that a central cause of
the financial crisis was "[tihe absence of significant regulatory controls" as
"the financial innovations which grew out of the mortgages-derivatives built
on other derivatives-were packaged and repackaged until no one could
identify that they contained and how much they were worth."); cf. Markowitz,
supra note 132, at 25-27 (proposing a program to determine the value of
billions of dollars in exotic debt instruments, the lack of understanding of
which triggered the global financial crisis).
143. Cf. Plank, supra note 123, at 800 (explaining that "the GSEs retain full
liability for the debt that they issue."). Professor Plank explains:
GSEs use the proceeds of this debt, among other purposes, to acquire
and hold mortgage loans and mortgage-backed securities for which the
GSEs retain full market value risk-not just default or credit risk.
Therefore, although the amount of the GSEs' debt is substantially lower
than the amount of their guaranteed mortgage-backed securities, the
GSEs' liability on such debt is greater than their liability on the
guarantees.
Id.; See Matthew Cowley, U.S. "Triple-A" Seems Secure, WALL ST. J., July 11,
2008, at C3, http://online.wsj.comlarticle/SB121569929864042645.html (noting
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac "play a key role in the troubled mortgages
market").
144. Moran, supra note 40, at 60 (explaining that Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac's purchase and guarantee of billions of dollars in loans to risky borrowers
was "a serious mistake in risk management," and "given the substantial losses
in their mortgage portfolios," their ability to raise "sufficient new capital from
private investors was infeasible"); cf. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys., Other Announcements (July 13, 2008), available at
http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20080713a.htm
(announcing
the authorization of supplemental as-needed lending to Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac to maintain the availability of mortgage credit "during a period of
stress in financial markets").
145. Press Release, Mortgage Bankers Association, Delinquencies Continue
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reported by approximately 120 lenders, including mortgage
bankers, commercial banks, and thrifts."146 The figure below
illustrates historical foreclosure rates from 1970 through the first
quarter of 2009.147 As shown, foreclosure rates have risen
dramatically since 2006 and set a new record in the second quarter
of 2009.148
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to Climb in Latest MBA National Delinquency Survey (Mar. 5, 2009),
available at http://www.mbaa.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/68008.htm
[hereinafter Delinquencies Continue to Climb]; MORTGAGE BANKERS
ASSOCIATION,
NATIONAL
DELINQUENCY
SURVEY
FACTS
(2008),
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/file/ResearchlNDSFactSheet.pdf. The survey
"represent[s] between 80 to 85 percent of all 'first-lien' residential mortgage
loans outstanding in the United States." Delinquencies Continue to Climb,
supra.
146. Id.
147. See Peter J. Elmer & Steven A. Seelig, The Rising Long-Term Trend of
Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosure Rates, 21-22 (Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.,
Working Paper No. 98-2), available at http://www.fdie.gov/bank/analyticall wor
king/98-2.pdf (providing data up to 1997); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MORTGAGE
ORIGINATIONS AND DELINQUENCY AND FORECLOSURE RATES: 1990 TO 2007
(2009),
http://www.census.gov/compendialstatab/2009/tables/09s1l54.xls
(providing data for 1998 to 2007); Delinquencies Continue to Climb, supra
note 145 (providing national delinquency data).
148. Press Release, Mortgage Bankers Association, Delinquencies Continue
to Climb, Foreclosures Flat in Latest MBA National Delinquency Survey (Aug.
20, 2009), available at http://www.mbaa.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/7005
O.htm.
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Confirming the MBA NDS, on May 13, 2009, RealtyTrac, a
foreclosure tracking company based in Irvine, California,
announced "that one in every 374 housing units received a
foreclosure filing in April [2009]."149 Like the MBA data, this is the
highest rate on RealtyTrac's record, and it represents a thirty-two
percent year-over-year increase.150
While BAPCPA dramatically lowered bankruptcy filings in
the United States after it went into effect on October 17, 2005,
data from the Bankruptcy Data Project at Harvard University
illustrates an upward trend in bankruptcy filings.151
Approximately 18,000 Chapter 13 bankruptcies were filed by
individuals in January 2006.152 By August 2007, this number
broke 40,000, and in April 2009, approximately 45,500 individuals
filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions. 153 As shown in the figure
below, according to the United States Bankruptcy Court, total
non-business bankruptcy filings in 2008 climbed to 1,074,225.154
Approximately two-thirds of these were Chapter 7 filings.15 5 While
these numbers remain well below the figures for 2005, the annual
growth rates in non-business bankruptcy filings from 2006 to 2007
(37.6 percent) and 2007 to 2008 (30.6 percent) exceed those posted
prior to BAPCPA.156
149. Press Release, RealtyTrac, Foreclosure Activity Remains at Record
at
2009),
available
in
April
(May
13,
Levels
http://www.realtytrac.com/content/press-releases/foreclosure-activity-remainsat-record-levels-in-april-4883.
150. Id.
at
Harvard,
Project
Data
Bankruptcy
generally
151. See
http://bdp.law.harvard.edu [hereinafter Bankruptcy Data Project] (last visited
Mar. 19, 2011) (providing searchable bankruptcy database showing upward
filing trend). See Thomas Evans & Paul B. Lewis, Bankruptcy Reform and the
Foreclosure Crisis, 28 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL'Y REP. 1, 1 (2009)
(stating that "[b]ankrupties have once again reached the levels associated with
the period prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005.").
152. See Bankruptcy Data Project at Harvard, http://bdp.law.harvard.edul
filingsdb.cfm (last visited Mar. 19, 2011) (calculating filings for the specified
period).
153. See Bankruptcy Data Project, supra note 151 (calculating filings for the
specified periods); see also Evans & Lewis, supra note 151, at 6 (noting that
the BAPCPA sought to "alter the percentage of Chapter 13 filings relative to
Chapter 7 filings .

. .

. Although immediately following the enactment of the

BAPCPA the number of consumers filing for Chapter 7 relief dropped, "the
share of Chapter 7 bankruptcies has been generally increasing. . . .").
154. See U.S. COURTS, BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS, http://www.uscourts.govb
nkrpctystats/statistics.htm#calendar (last visited Mar. 19, 2011) (providing
numbers of bankruptcy filings per twelve-month periods).
155. See id. (showing 714,389 Chapter 7 filings in calendar year 2008).
156. See id. (showing 2,039,214 non-business bankruptcy filings in 2005;
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V. MAKING THE "SAFE HARBOR" SAFE
Section 109(h)(3) is referred to as a "safe harbor" provision to
protect the debtor experiencing "exigent circumstances" from being
deemed ineligible for bankruptcy protection. 15 7 However, as
discussed in Part II.C., supra, section 109(h)(3) has limited
prophylactic capability.15 8

A. Parallelto Special ProvisionsAdopted in Response to
HurricaneKatrina
As discussed in Part VI.A., infra, during Hurricane Katrina
the U.S. Trustee recognized that these extreme circumstances
called for extreme measures. Pursuant to Section 109(h)(2), the

597,965 in 2006; 822,590 in 2007; and 1,074,225 in 2008).
157. In re Thompson, 344 B.R. at 902. "In the event the counseling cannot
be obtained pre petition, § 109(h)(3) provides a "safe harbor" where the debtor
may obtain the counseling post petition if "exigent circumstances" merit a
waiver and are satisfactory to the court." Id.
158. Michael Newman, Comment, BAPCPA's New Section 109(h) Credit
Counseling Requirement: Is It Having the Effect Congress Intended?, 2007
UTAH L. REV. 489, 491-92.
Furthermore, the "safe harbor" provision of BAPCPA's section 109(h)(3)
is limited and creates an exception for non-compliant bankruptcy
petitioners to obtain credit counseling post-petition only where he or she
can prove "exigent circumstances" that the court believes merit a
waiver. Otherwise, if a petitioner fails to comply with section 109(h), he
or she is simply not eligible for bankruptcy relief under any chapter of
the Bankruptcy Code.
Id.
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U.S. Trustee suspended the requirement for debtors to acquire
pre-bankruptcy counseling because the hurricane had disrupted
the availability of counseling services.159 Similarly, this proposal
would provide relief for those caught up in the global "economic
tsunami" to lessen the burden by removing the credit counseling
hurdle that appears to cause greater harm than good. Although
the "safe harbor" provision in Section 109(h)(3) provides a distinct
basis for relief and gives the specific authority to suspend the
applicability of the Section 109(h) credit counseling provision, the
special circumstances of the nation's economic crisis provides a
basis for the Trustee to suspend its applicability. At a minimum,
Congress should act to take emergency measures to do so.
B. Parallelto ContractualConcepts of Commercial
Impracticabilityand Force Majeure

Parties in contractual disputes are asserting that the present
severe global economic crisis impacting our nation is creating an
extraordinary circumstance in the context of commercial
impracticability and force majeure contractual provisions. Courts
are being presented with this novel issue in matters that have
recently been initiated in at least two commercial disputes.16 0
Commercial impracticability is a general contract principle
which asserts that "[w]here, after a contract is made, a party's
performance is made impracticable without his fault by the
occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic
assumption on which the contract was made, his duty to render
that performance is discharged, unless the language or the
circumstances indicate the contrary." 6 1 Force majeure is also a
general contract principle which asserts that an unforeseen event
that renders the performance of the contract impossible is a valid
excuse for non-performance.162 Force majeure events include acts

159. Clifford J. White, Acting Director, Executive Office for the United
States Trustee, Department of Justice, Testimony before the Subcommittee on
Commercial and Administrative Law, Committee on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives 8 (Apr. 26, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ustleo/pu
blicaffairs/testimony/docs/testimony 060426.pdf.
160. Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co.,
582 F. 3d 721 (7th Cir. 2009); Rohm & Haas Co. v. The Dow Chemical Co., et
al., No. 4309-CC, 2009 LEXIS 31 (Del. Ch. 2009).
161. Wayne Barnes, The Objective Theory of Contracts, 76 U. CIN. L. REV.
1119, 1134 (2008) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261).
162. See Jonathan Riley, Embracing the Principle of Growth: A Call for the
Expansion of the Doctrine of Fortuitous Event in Louisiana Law, 35 S.U. L.
REV. 413, 416-18 (2008) (describing the similarities of the concepts of force
majeure, fortuitous event, and impossibility of performance).
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of nature, such as floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, and acts of
humanity, such as wars, strikes, and riots.163 A concept analogous
to force majeure is "impossibility of performance." Commercial
impracticability deals with the difficulty of performance, while
force majeure concerns the inability to perform. Either of these
concepts may be included as provisions in contracts and the
particular terms may be tailored to the circumstances and needs of
the specific transaction.
Contract parties are seeking to excuse performance with
respect to force majeure contract clauses and the general legal
concept of commercial impracticability because of this severe
economic crisis. 164 Although to date we have found no evidence
that a court has specifically ruled on the merits in favor of parties
seeking relief from contract obligations using the rationale of
commercial impracticability or force majeure, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals in Hoosier Energy Rural Electric Cooperative,
Inc. v. John Hancock Life Insurance Co. 1 65 affirmed a preliminary
injunction based upon the argument of force majeure created by
the financial crisis.16 6
Hoosier Energy involves a complex sale-lease out (SILO) tax
avoidance scheme. The SILO agreement involved assets owned by
Hoosier Energy that were sold to John Hancock and then leased
back to Hoosier Energy.167 As a part of the deal, Hoosier Energy
had to get a "credit default swap" from Ambac, which guaranteed
that John Hancock would receive all of its lease payments.168
Under this agreement, Ambac had to maintain a certain credit
rating threshold. 169 When Ambac's credit rating fell below the
threshold-due to the global economic crisis-Hoosier Energy was
required to find another guarantor. 170 Hoosier Energy worked
diligently to find a replacement for Ambac, but it proved extremely
difficult in the existing credit climate. 171 John Hancock gave

163. Id. at 417.
164. Michael Orey, The Financial Crisis Excuse: Companies Are Trying to
Get Out of Deals by Arguing that the Meltdown Is So Bad It Should Void Legal
Obligations,BUSINESSWEEK, Feb. 23, 2009, at 32.
165. Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co.,
582 F. 3d 721 (7th Cir. 2009).
166. Id. at 728-30.
167. Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins.Co.,
588 F. Supp. 2d 919, 922 (S.D. Ind. 2008).
168. Id. at 922-23.
169. Id. at 922.
170. Id. at 924.
171. Id. at 932-33.
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Hoosier Energy several extensions. 172 Hoosier Energy finally
secured a tentative agreement with Berkshire-Hathaway at
considerable financial pain to Hoosier Energy, but needed a
ninety-day extension to close the deal. 173 John Hancock refused to
grant Hoosier Energy another extension.174 John Hancock's refusal
triggered a clause in the agreement that obligated Ambac to pay a
substantial termination payment to John Hancock that, in turn,
would obligate Hoosier Energy to immediately begin reimbursing
Ambac.175 Hoosier Energy's obligation would have forced it into
bankruptcy, 176 and thus, the suit was filed asking the court for the
time to close the deal with Berkshire-Hathaway.
John Hancock argued that New York law, the substantive law
under which this case was decided,' 77 does not recognize the
doctrine of commercial impracticability.178 However, the appeals
court acknowledged that New York does recognize the doctrine of
impossibility.179 While the court pointed out certain difficulties
Hoosier Energy may have in proving the doctrine of impossibility
under the premise of a severe economic crisis, the court still held
that such proof was not outside the bounds of reasonableness. 8 0
The court held that if Hoosier Energy could prove at trial that it
had a duty to find a replacement for Ambac, as opposed to a mere
option to find a replacement for Ambac, then Hoosier Energy had a
real chance at proving the impossibility defense.' 8' The court
reasoned that under the duty theory it is possible that Hoosier
Energy could prove:
that (a) all parties to the transaction assumed, when they
negotiated the terms, that it would be possible to find some other
intermediary with adequate credit standing, and (b) as a result of
a financial crisis, no such intermediary existed in late 2008, no
matter how much Hoosier Energy offered to post in liquid assets
to secure its obligations.182
The court further reasoned that because both parties would

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 933.
Id. at 925-26.
Id.
Id. at 926.
Id.
Hoosier, 582 F. 3d. at 725.
Id. at 727-29.
Id. at 727.
Id. at 729-30.
Id. at 729.
Id (emphasis in original).
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not have been anticipating or expecting a financial crisis of the
magnitude experienced in 2008, Hoosier Energy's ability to
perform the contract would qualify as impossible under New York
law.18 3 The appeals court also found significant the fact that
Hoosier Energy was only asking for a temporary delay in finding a
replacement for Ambac.184
So it appears that if a company's predicament is precipitated
by a global economic crisis, the company has taken reasonable
steps to abate the predicament, and the company is asking for a
temporary delay in order to meet its obligations, then the company
may have a viable impossibility of performance or commercial
impracticability defense. It should be noted that commercial
impracticability is easier to prove than impossibility of
performance; therefore, in states that recognize the commercial
impracticability defense, the thresholds of proof should be lower
than in states that recognize only impossibility of performance.
In another case, Donald Trump, the renowned luxury resort
and hotel financier, contended that the economic tsunami qualified
as a force majeure event in response to a suit filed by Deutsche
Bank to collect on a $40 million loan that was personally
guaranteed by Trump. 8 5 Legally, Trump's position may be
stronger than Hoosier Energy's because his contract contained a
force majeure clause with the unusually comprehensive language
that allows any matter that is "not within the reasonable control of
the borrower" to be deemed a force majeure event. 86 The court did
not get the opportunity to rule on this matter because Trump and
Duetsche agreed to discontinue the suit. 8 7 However, the mere fact
that it was asserted by Trump to his presumed advantage signifies
its potential viability.
In documents filed in the Delaware Chancery Court on
February 3, 2009, Dow Chemical cited the unprecedented global

183. Id.
184. Id. at 730. "The district court itself stressed the word 'temporary' in
'temporary commercial impracticability'; we are confident that the court will
not allow 'temporary' to drag out in the direction of permanence." Id. See also
MidFirst Bank v. 159 W. 24th St. LLC, No. 107873/09, slip op. at 8 (N.Y. June
21, 2010) (citing Hoosier, 588 F. Supp. at 931) (stating that "parties may be
temporarily excused from performance under a contract if 'unexpectedly and
radically changed conditions render the judicial enforcement of certain
promises of little or no utility' under 'sufficiently extreme circumstances."').
185. Orey, supra note 164.
186. Id.
187. Mary Ellen Podmolik, Donald Trump, Deutsche Bank Reach Truce over
Chicago Skyscraper's Finances, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 4, 2009, http://art
7
icles.chicagotribune.com/2009-03-04/news/090303053 _1_donald-trump-trump
-international-hotel-skyscraper.
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economic meltdown as its reason for reneging on its $18.9 billion
acquisition deal to purchase Rohm & Haas.188 This case settled on
the eve of its March 9, 2009, trial date in which Dow Chemical was
able to restructure the deal in its favor.18 9 While the court did not
have an opportunity to rule on the validity of the factual basis of
Dow Chemical's contentions, the factual contentions were likely
strong enough to allow Dow to wrangle pre-trial concessions from
Rohm & Haas.o9 0
Hoosier Energy, Donald Trump, and Dow Chemical are
examples of venues recognizing that the global economic meltdown
may be an exigent circumstance necessitating a revision of
contract terms. The court in Hoosier Energy asserted that it is
reasonably likely that Hoosier Energy will prevail on the merits
that it suffered a temporary impossibility to perform based upon
the global crisis.191 The court recognized that this is an unusual
remedy for unusual times.
C. Establishinga PrimaFacie Case

The severe economic crisis can serve as a basis for
establishing a prima facie case of exigent circumstances. The
creditor can rebut it by showing that this particular debtor was an
irresponsible debtor; however, the debtor should be able to walk
into a court and make his or her assertion. Many judges have
lamented the harshness of the pre-filing credit counseling
provisions.192 By making the assertion of the global economic crisis
a prima facie exigent circumstance, the court would then have the
power to grant relief to deserving debtors and withhold relief from
undeserving debtors.

188. Rohm & Haas Co. v. The Dow Chemical Co., et al., No. 4309-CC,
Answer of Defendants Dow Chemical Company and Ramses Acquisition Corp,
Paragraphs 9 and 13-30, available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/11602453/
Dows-Answer-to-Rohm-Haass-Lawsuit; Orey, supra note 164.
189. Shawn Langlois and Christopher Hinton, Dow Chemical, Rohm &
Haas Shares Gain on Deal, WALL ST. J., Mar.
10, 2009,
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/dow-chemical-rohm-haas-shares-gain.
190. Dow Chemical and Rohm Haas Reach Deal to Complete Merger, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/09/business/worldbusin
ess/09iht-9dow.20710410.html.
191. Hoosier, 588 F. Supp. at 727-30.
192. In re Bolling, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS at *3-4; In re Enloe, 373 B.R. at 13334; In re Rendler, 368 B.R. 1, 4 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2007); In re Gossett, 369 B.R.
361, 370 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007); In re Manalad, 360 B.R. 288, 307 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 2007); In re Valdez, 335 B.R. at 803; See Baucher, supra note 18
(discussing the lamentations of bankruptcy judges over the harshness and
rigidity of the pre-filing credit counseling provisions).
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ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS: AMEND SECTION 109(H)

On May 1, 2007, Yvonne D. Jones, Director of Financial
Markets and Community Investment for the United States
Government Accountability Office, a non-partisan agency, stated
that pre-bankruptcy credit counseling may not be beneficial to
debtors because by the time the debtors file bankruptcy, their
financial situation has deteriorated to the point that they have no
viable alternative but to file bankruptcy. 9 3 As evidence of the
ineffectiveness of the credit counseling requirement, Director
Jones proffered that less than two percent of debtors counseled
from October 2006 to October 2007 entered into a debt
management plan rather than filing for bankruptcy protection.1 9 4
Another issue Director Jones raises in her statement is that the
pre-bankruptcy credit counseling may not be achieving its basic
purpose, which is to give the debtor information from which the
debtor can evaluate bankruptcy and its consequences and
alternatives knowledgeably prior to filing. 195 The Director also
points out that debtors in severe financial straits generally have
already interfaced with a bankruptcy attorney prior to receiving
credit counseling and the actual counseling then becomes a mere
formality.196 Because anecdotal data suggests that the vast
majority of debtors still file bankruptcy even after the credit
counseling, the merit of such counseling has been questioned.19 7
Such data infers that pre-bankruptcy credit counseling may be an
administrative hurdle rather than a valuable financial tool for
debtors.
Moreover, as stated in the introduction, many courts and
commentators alike have complained that Section 109(h) (as with
much of BAPCPA) is not a model of statutory clarity, 198 resulting
in the conflicts discussed in the legal issues presented here. Based
upon these concerns, the following are suggested amendments to
the pre-bankruptcy credit counseling requirement.

193. YVONNE D. JONES, DIRECTOR OF FINANCIAL MARKETS AND COMMUNITY
INVESTMENTS, U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, BANKRUPTCY REFORM:
THE VALUE OF CREDIT COUNSELING REQUIREMENT NOT CLEAR, TESTIMONY
BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 8 (2007),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07778t.pdf.
194. Id. at 10.
195. Id. at 10.
196. See id. at 11.
197. Id. at 11; See In re Gaddis, No. 07-40476, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1879, at

*8-9 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2007) (dismissing the debtor's petition for technical noncompliance with filing requirements).
198. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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A. Eliminate the Pre-Bankruptcy Credit Counseling
Requirement Altogether
One recommended solution would be to eliminate the prebankruptcy credit counseling requirement altogether. First, it
appears that the purpose of the requirement is not being fulfilled,
and second, all debtors are required to receive financial
management counseling prior to discharge.1 99 The fact that the
evidence suggests that the pre-bankruptcy credit counseling
requirement is not fulfilling its stated purpose 200 suggests that the
provision be eliminated. A study has already been commissioned
by The Executive Office for the U.S. Trustee (EOUST) that
operates the U.S. Trustees Program (USTP), which is in turn
responsible for managing the pre-bankruptcy agencies and which
concluded that within the field of credit counseling there are no
common standards or measurements that can meaningfully assess
the efficacy of pre-bankruptcy counseling agencies. 20 1 This means
that Congress may have legislated required credit counseling
without any credible evidence that it works, and without any
relevant way to assess the viability of the provision's
effectiveness. 202 Such a naive basis is an unwise paradigm for any
legislative effort, but is even more so when involving bankruptcy
legislation. These are not simply numbers in a computer data
bank. These are real people with real problems looking for real
solutions at a critical stage of their financial lives. It is
irresponsible to enact provisions with no demonstrated benefits,
but with severe and harsh consequences for noncompliance. 203 In
the case of In re Manalad,204 the bankruptcy court aptly describes
some of the deleterious effects of noncompliance to Section 109(h):
For a debtor in financial straits, this means the expense of another

199. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(11) (2010); Id. § 1328(g)(1).
200. JONES, supra note 193, at 10.
201. NOREEN CLANCY & STEPHEN J. CARROLL, PRE-BANKRUPTCY CREDIT
COUNSELING, RAND CORPORATION (2007), http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/public

affairs/reports studies/docs/Pre-BankruptcyCredit CounselingReportRan
d.pdf.
202. See Karen Gross & Susan Block-Lieb, Empty Mandate or Opportunity
for Innovation? Prepetition Credit Counseling and Post - Petition Financial
Management Education, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 549, 549-50 (2005)
(stating that prior to the passage of BAPCPA, there was no empirical evidence
that "consumer debtors would benefit from financial management instruction,
particularly when they were already experiencing considerable stress."); Id. at
553-60 (giving a brief history of the credit counseling industry).
203. See generally Braucher, supra note 18 (discussing the challenges
presented by the 2005 amendments).
204. 360 B.R. 288 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2007).
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filing fee ($ 299[.]00) and the time, effort, and possible attorneys'
fees needed to prepare a new petition and set of case commencement
documents. It also means a potential limited availability of the
protection of the automatic stay. Under § 362(c)(3), when a debtor
files a petition after a petition was pending within the preceding
year, the debtor may lose the protection of § 362(a) thirty days after
filing the later petition with respect to secured creditors and lessors.
A debtor has an opportunity to obtain an order continuing the
automatic stay but must promptly file a motion, schedule a hearing,
and overcome a presumption that the later case was hot filed in
good faith. For debtors who had one case dismissed, then a second
case dismissed for failure to comply with the Credit Counseling
Requirements, they must wait a full year to file another petition if
they wish for any protection of the automatic stay. 205
Under Sections 727(a)(11) and 1328(g)(1) of the Code, Chapter
7 and Chapter 13 debtors are required to complete a personal
financial management course from an approved budget and credit
counseling agency prior to discharge. The criteria of the course are
specified under 11 U.S.C. Section 111(d); however, what should be
noted is that the criteria for pre-bankruptcy counseling are the
same as for post-bankruptcy counseling. Therefore, debtors are
going to get similar counseling twice. It is notable that research
shows that while it is debatable whether debtors receive any
benefit from the required pre-bankruptcy counseling, 206 financial
professionals believe that the required post-filing counseling does
have value. 207 American citizens do suffer from credit ignorance,
and there is a need to provide financial direction and guidance to
those in desperate financial condition. 208 However, having to make
financial decisions under duress is not the manner in which many
financial professionals believe that advantageous financial
behaviors are likely to be cultivated. 209
There is no need for two counseling sessions covering the
same material especially because the pre-bankruptcy credit
counseling appears to be a mere formality-another obstacle to
clear-providing no material benefit. Therefore, Congress should
eliminate the pre-bankruptcy credit counseling requirement and
maintain
the
post-filing
financial
management
course
requirement.

205. Id. at 307.
206. JONES, supra note 193, at 10-11.
207. Id. at 13.

208. Nathalie Martin & Ocean Tama y Sweet, Mind Games: Rethinking
BAPCPA's Debtor Education Provisions,31 S. ILL. U. L. J. 517, 520-24 (2007).
209. JONES, supra note 193, at 10-11.
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B. Alternative Solutions to Mitigate the Harshness
of the Consequences
In lieu of eliminating the pre-bankruptcy credit counseling
provision of Section 109(h), Congress can take measures to
mitigate the harshness of the provision. First, Congress can pass
an amendment to this provision that mandates a suspension of the
pre-bankruptcy credit counseling provision during this
unprecedented economic crisis. The provision could be amended to
provide the U.S. Trustee with the authority to remove the
suspension when the economic crisis has abated; or Congress could
give the Trustee the power to both initiate and remove the
suspension based upon particular economic parameters.
Such legislative action would be similar to a provision in
Section 109(h)(2) where the Trustee for any particular district can
suspend the pre-bankruptcy credit counseling requirement when
the Trustee determines that adequate counseling services are not
available. Section 109(h)(2) also mandates that a review of the
circumstances precipitating any suspension of the requirement be
undertaken at least once every year. In the aftermath of the
Hurricane Katrina disaster, Section 109(h)(2) was employed to
suspend the pre-bankruptcy credit counseling requirement
because adequate counseling services were not accessible. The
suspension was removed when such services became readily
obtainable.
Second, Congress could specify certain threatened creditor
actions such as foreclosures, garnishments, and repossessions as
per se "exigent circumstances," even if the petition is filed on the
eve of such threatened activity, notwithstanding the fact that
notice of such actions may be provided to the debtor. Many times
debtors are attempting to negotiate with creditors until the last
minute in an effort to avoid filing bankruptcy. Such action would
offer some certainty to an already stressful situation and would
allow such ongoing negotiations to continue without the debtor
having to worry about complying with a statutory provision that
debtors generally would not be aware of until all other options
have been explored. 210 Further, at a point where time and money
are in limited supply, the debtor would not have to expend those
resources searching out qualified financial counseling that
evidence has shown has resulted in debtors ultimately filing

210. See Braucher, supra note 18, at 104 (suggesting that courts may be
able to use the bad faith negotiations of creditors to excuse the credit
counseling deficiencies of last-minute filing debtor).
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bankruptcy. 211 The money and/or time not spent on credit
counseling can be used to help in a potential agreement with
creditors. Further, these debtors would remain obligated to get
personal financial management counseling to be eligible for a
discharge. 212
Third, Congress can pass an amendment to this statute to
limit the requirement for credit counseling to the debtors who
could obviously benefit from it, that is, the debtors whose debts
consist significantly as debts for luxury goods and services. Such
luxuries might include second homes, jewelry, vacations, and
gambling debts. The nature of the debts of any particular debtor is
discernible from the any schedules and statements a debtor is
required to file. In addition, a supplemental schedule could be
required that would specifically reveal this type of information.
Many debtors are in financial straits because of unforeseen
circumstances such as lost jobs and unexpected medical bills and
may have otherwise been financially responsible in managing
their financial affairs. 213 The court in Adams v. Findlay214 notes
that strict compliance with section 109(h) is mandated "even
where credit counseling would be an empty charade, for example,
where sudden illness, loss of employment, divorce, incarceration of
the bread winner or any number of causes not related to fiscal
irresponsibility compel a person to seek refuge in the bankruptcy
court." 215
These responsible debtors may have understood and practiced
financial competency, but a lost job, loss of a pension, or the
inability to pay an unexpected medical bill as a result of a global
meltdown brings them to the brink of financial disaster. The
directive to compel the irresponsible debtors to seek counseling
prior to filing bankruptcy, that is, those whose debts consist
significantly of luxury goods and services, while allowing the
"responsible debtors" to avert counseling is equitable. Again, even
the responsible debtors are required to receive personal financial
management counseling to qualify for a discharge. 216

211.
212.
213.
(S. D.
214.
215.
216.

JONES, supra note 193, at 11.
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(11) (2006); Id. § 1328(g)(1).
Adams v. Finley, No. 06 Civ. 6039, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81591, at *8
N.Y. Nov. 3, 2006).
Id.
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(11); Id. § 1328(g)(1).
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VII.CONCLUsIoN
The present economic global crisis that our nation is
experiencing is unprecedented. It will likely be years before the
full scale of the magnitude of this crisis is calculated. The impact it
is and will be having upon our economy indeed resists
quantification as it impacts the lives of everyday people in both
objective and subjectively personal ways.
The proposals we suggest here are reasonable measures to
lessen the hardship upon people who are in need of the protection
of the bankruptcy courts. The bankruptcy courts have authority,
pursuant to the exigent circumstances provision of Section
109(h)(3), to at least give prima facie recognition to the economic
crisis in making determinations of "exigent circumstance."
Alternatively, we suggest Congress needs to act emergently and
with compassion to correct the impact of the law, recognizing that
at the time BAPCPA was passed this economic crisis was not
generally predicted. Even in the sacredness of the contractual
setting, the impact of the global crisis is being recognized as a
basis for potentially voiding contractual obligations. The U.S. saw
the need for implementing emergency measures in response to
Katrina. The data is in. The crisis is real. Measures such as those
proposed here should be adopted to lessen the hardship upon
prospective debtors during this severe crisis and for any future
economic crises of this magnitude.

